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INTRODUCTION
When I was a law student, taking a course in in-
troductory corporate law, what was heard around the
halls was that most of corporate law would be learned if
one understood Perlman v. Feldmann. I agree with that
statement, and I have agreed more strongly each year I
myself have taught introductory corporate law. Indeed, I
now believe one would also learn a good deal about the
significance of-the corporation in American life during
the past two decades. Unfortunately, however, it seems
to me-on the basis of having read everything of which I
was aware concerning one of the most widely discussed
cases of recent times-that very few lawyers understand
the meaning of that decision.
A. The Transaction
(i)
The results of the remand ordered by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals were reported in the New York Times on July 19,
1957, in a story headlined "Stockholders Win Suit for 2 Million"
and datelined "Stamford, Conn., July 18 (AP)':
District Court Judge Robert P. Anderson today ordered C.
Russell Feldmann of Stamford to pay $2,000,000 to stock-
holders of a company of which he once was president. The
suit was brought by a group of stockholders of the Newport
Steel Company of Newport, Ky....
Merritt, Chapman & Scott is said to hold most of the
Newport stock.'
(ii)2
Charles Russell Feldmann was born on February 8, 1898, in
Philadelphia to devout Quaker parents who moved to New York
seven years later. While attending public grammar school, he
worked in a silent movie theater changing reels for $2 per week.
He attended day, and then evening high school, and in 1913 began
working as an office boy for Robert Garden, a Pierce-Arrow
automobile distributor in New York, and the father of Mary
Garden, the opera singer.
Four years later, Feldmann joined a firm installing new produc-
tion and cost systems in the leather industry. On June 14, 1919,
having saved $1,000 for a wedding trip, he married Charlotte M.
Vega, who persuaded him to use $600 to purchase an industrial
leather belting manufacturing and repair company, which was sold
N. Y. Times, July 19, 1957, at 22, col. 2.
2 The material in this section is based upon the following: the entry for Feldmann in
WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 1970-71; a biographic essay entitled "Personality: Expansion
Through Mergers" in the N.Y. Times, July 3, 1966, §3, at 3, col. 3; Feldmann's testimony
in Perlman %'. Feldmann as contained in the Appendix to Brief for Defendants-Appellees,
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) [hereinafter referred to as Defendants'
Brief] at 93b-97b; and Findings of Fact 5. 12, 13, 14, 16, and 19, Perlman v. Feldmann,
154 F. Supp. 436, 437-38 (D. Conn. 1957).
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in 1925. Charlotte had siblings named John and Josephine, and
she and Russell had three daughters: Carolyn, married to John F.
Otto; Phyllis, married to Joseph V. McKee, Jr.; and Barbara Jane.
From 1925 to 1927, Feldmann operated in industrial real es-
tate, 3 and in 1928-having previously, together with C. L. Cum-
mings, entered the first diesel-powered racing car to run on the
Indianapolis Speedway-he purchased, reorganized and sold to
Alfred P. Sloane the Winton Engine Company, which became the
nucleus for General Motors' diesel division.
4
In the latter part of that year, Feldmann formed the Automo-
bile Radio Corporation-the first company to install a radio in an
automobile commercially-a half interest in which was purchased
by the Chrysler Corporation one year later. As Philco Corpo-
ration became interested in the operation in November, 1930, a
new corporation known as Transitone Automobile Radio Corpo-
ration was formed, from which Feldmann resigned as president in
1937 and acquired 87 percent of the Simplex Radio Company, the
controlling interest in which he sold to Philco early the following
year.
By 1940, Philco had acquired all of Feldmann's interests in
both Simplex and Transitone, and in November or December of
that year, Feldmann acquired the controlling interest in, and be-
came the president of, the Foster Machine Company, which later
that year purchased the International Machine Tool Company. In
1942, Feldmann acquired the controlling interest in Strong, Car-
lisle & Hammond Company of Cleveland, Ohio, which acquired
almost all of the stock of the Detrola Corporation, a manufacturer
of radios and phonographs. The following year the latter was
3 According to a story in the New York Times of October 18. 1970. § 8, at 10, col. 1,
"McGraw Hill Building to Be Rerented," Feldmann in 1967 acquired the old Sunshine
Biscuit plant in Queens which he turned into the Long Island City Mart and "reportedly
paid close to $20-million for the 34-story McGraw-Hill tower."
4 The description given in the text is based on the Who's Who entry and the New York
Times biographic essay, note 2, supra. In My Years with General Motors (1963), Alfred
P. Sloan, Jr. notes that "After [Charles F.] Kettering bought himself a diesel-powered
yacht in April 1928, these engines became a major preoccupation of his," that "Mr.
Kettering became acquainted with [George W. Codrington, the president of Winton,] as
the result of ordering Winton engines for his second yacht. He bought those engines simply
because Codrington agreed, though reluctantly, to put in a new kind of injector that one of
the Winton engineers was developing at the time, and which Mr. Kettering felt held great
promise. I don't know who first suggested the idea of Winton's coming into General
Motors. In any event, we began to negotiate formally in the late summer of 1929.
Agreement on the purchase of Winton had almost been reached in October when the great
market crash temporarily confused the picture," and that "[flinally, in June 1930 the
Winton operations became a part of General Motors with Mr. Codrington continuing as
president. Winton's principal market continued to be in large marine engines. (footnote
omitted)." Id. at 346-47.
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merged with the International Machine Tool Corporation, and the
resulting company- in 1945- acquired a manufacturer of refrig-
erator units, the Universal Cooler Company. This company had a
wholly owned Canadian subsidiary .(Utah Radio Products) which
manufactured radio interiors and transformers and which had a
wholly owned subsidiary, Caswell-Runyan Company-a manufac-
turer of radio and television cabinets -which in turn had a sub-
sidiary known as the Goshen Veneer Company, which made
veneered panels for such cabinets. Finally, either in 1945 or 1946,
the International Detrola Corporation acquired through merger
almost all of the outstanding stock of the Rohr Aircraft Corpo-
ration, a manufacturer of aircraft components.
On August 8, 1946, the plant and equipment of the Andrews
Steel Corporation, located at Newport, Kentucky, were acquired
for approximately $1,665,000, together with all of the stock of the
subsidiary Hardy-Burlingham Mining Company bituminous coal
mine. 5 In 1949, the name Newport Steel Corporation was as-
sumed, and the Universal Cooler Co. of Canada, Ltd., the Elk-
hart, Indiana, plant known as the Aircraft Tool Division and the
Rohr Aircraft Corporation-which had accounted for substantial
portions of sales and profits during 1948 and 1949-were all
disposed of.6 In August, 1950, the principal business of Newport
was the production of steel ingots and the manufacturing of hot
rolled steel and sheet steel.
Feldmann and members of his family personally owned approx-
imately 85 percent of the stock of Strong, Carlisle & Hammond
Company, which, as indicated above, had been acquired in 1942.
7
In addition, Feldmann owned 60 percent-and his wife and three
daughters each 10 percent-of the stock of Henney Motor Co.,
Inc. 8
5 See Finding of Fact 19. Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436, 438; Cf. Defendants'
Brief, supra note 2, at 96b-97b.
Q. What did Newport pay for those facilities, if you know? A. The
inventory and the assets, including the stock of the Hardy-Burlingham Min-
ing Company was about $3,700,000 some odd thousand dollars. (Charles
Russell Feldmann- For Defendants- Direct.)
6 The Universal Cooler Division, which had been planned to be sold prior to August 31,
1950, was actually sold on October 31, 1950.
7 Feldmann was Chairman of the Board of Strong, Carlisle & Hammond Company from
1942 to 1956 and sold his interest in the latter year.
8 Feldmann testified, "In 1946, latter part of 1946, I acquired 100% of the Henney
Motor Company of Freeport, Illinois." Defendants' Brief, at 95b. In addition. the Who's
Who entry indicates "purchased, reorganized and sold Winton Engine Co., Henney Motor
Co., Victor-Penninsular Co., 1928." Finally, a story in the column "Market Place" in the
New York Times, December 7, 1966, at 66, col. 8 noted that "Feldmann's... built more
than 120 ... battery-powered cars since 1960 ... under the Henney Kilowatt emblem, and
58 utilities, perhaps hopeful of a runaway market someday, bought the cars for demonstra-
tion purposes."
FALL 1974]
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(iii)
Newport commenced negotiations with Follansbee Steel Cor-
poration in May, 1950, looking toward a merger of the two com-
panies. 9 The man who initiated, 10 conducted, and was present at
these negotiations, was Harold Ruttenberg, a steel broker of Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania.'1 Ruttenberg began to engage in general
brokerages of businesses in January, 1949. From June, 1946, to
January, 1949, he had been Vice-President of the Portsmouth
Steel Corporation; for the ten years preceding 1946, he had occu-
pied the position of Research Director of the United Steel Work-
ers of America, except for a few years during World War II when
he was Assistant Director of the Steel Division, War Production
Board.1
2
In steel manufacturing, a cold rolled sheet has a finer finish and
a lighter gauge than a hot rolled sheet and is used principally for
more difficult work. Newport had no cold rolling facilities, which
Follansbee possessed. Consequently, in the summer of 1950, if
such facilities could have been obtained at a price and under
terms which were advantageous to Newport, it might have been
desirable- as Feldmann understood- for Newport to install cold
rolling facilities in order to give Newport a more fully integrated
operation. 13
On June 26, 1950, the Korean War commenced.' 4 Feldmann
testified as follows concerning a lease being negotiated with the
United States Government on Newport's Detroit plant early in
August of 1950:
We negotiated a lease calling for the payment of $191,000
which was to be called a restoration fee, because the plant
9 Finding of Fact 47, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 170 (D. Conn. 1952).
10 See Appendix to Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 105a, Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) [hereinafter referred to as Plaintiffs' Brief]:
Q. Who initiated or how were the merger negotiations initiated?-that is
with Follansbee-A. There was a broker by the name of Harold Ruttenberg
of Pittsburgh who initiated the contact between Mark Follansbee and myself.
(Excerpts from Deposition of Charles Russell Feldmann).
"See Transcript of Record at 47, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corporation, 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1952) [hereinafter referred to as Birnbaum Record]:
Harold Ruttenberg is a steel broker of Pittsburgh, Pa. Ruttenberg was the
person who conducted and was present at the negotiations between
Feldmann on behalf of Newport and the representatives of Follansbee
Steel Corporation. (Affidavit of Nathan B. Kogan, Attorney for Plaintiffs).
12 See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 10, at 126a (Excerpts from Deposition of Harold J.
Ruttenberg- for Plaintiffs- Direct).
13 Findings of Fact 45-47, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 169-70.
14 Finding of Fact 42, Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436, 442 (D. Conn. 1957).
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had certain equipment, electronic equipment and testing
equipment and other equipment that was built into the plant.
With the Korean War on, we might have been called upon in
those facilities to manufacture some of the same type of
equipment we made during World War II. In that plant we
manufactured 70% of all of the land mine detectors that were
used in World War II. 1 did not want to disturb those facil-
ities and then get the building back at the end of a lease
should they not exercise their option to purchase them, and
have them destroy these facilities. 15
In the merger negotiations, Follansbee would not consider an
exchange basis less favorable than 13/4 shares of Newport for one
share of Follansbee. Feldmann stated that a merger on the basis
of 13/4t0 one would not be in the best interests of Newport and all
its stockholders, and took the position that a fair and proper
exchange ratio should be 1'/2 to one. Ruttenberg agreed that
Feldmann's position was a reasonable one, 16 though he tried to
influence Feldmann to consider the Follansbee suggestion by
pointing out that Feldmann would personally profit substantially
15 Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 128b-129b (Charles Russell Feldmann-For
Defendants-Direct). Cf. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1966, note 2, supra:
C. Russell Feldmann, chairman and president of the National Union
Electric Corporation .... explained that business was especially good in the
Advanced Science division, which makes special fuses for hand grenades and
other weapons, and the Eureka Williams Company, one of the largest makers
of vacuum cleaners and other home care products. "We're building a little
better 'mousetrap' there and are getting a bigger share of the business," he
noted with a grin....
In keeping with the interties between most of his ventures, Mr. Feldmann
came into the vacuum cleaner business through the Detrola Corporation,
which during World War II manufactured land mine detectors, or sweepers
as they are called. Thus, when he became chief executive of National Union,
it was only fitting that he work out the acquisition of the Eureka Williams
Corporation, a famous name in the business for more than 50 years.
16 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 40b:
Q. But you did think Feldmann was reasonable in holding out for lV/2 for
I. A. Yes, because Federal Stamping and Enameling is, in my judgment and
only my judgment, over evaluated on Follansbee's books. (Excerpts from
Deposition of Harold J. Ruttenberg).
Cf. Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 130b:
Q. Who was the largest shareholder listed on [Follansbee's] proxy state-
ment? A. As I recall, a Mr. Christman, who was about 84 years old or 86
years old and who was formerly chairman and president of their subsidiary
known as the Federal Enameling and Stamping Company.
And when they-Follansbee-acquired it, he became chairman of the
board of Follansbee, and as I recall the deal, they paid so much cash and so
many shares of stock, and that is how he became the largest stockholder of
Follansbee. (Charles Russell Feldmann- For Defendants- Direct).
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thereby.1 7 Follansbee never made a firm offer of merger on any
basis."' On July 12, 1950, Follansbee and Newport mutually
agreed to suspend the merger negotiations,' 9 and on July 28,
1950, Newport's Board of Directors unanimously approved the
suspension of the negotiations for an indefinite period.
20
On August 3, 1950, a letter signed by Feldmann as President
and containing the following paragraph was sent to all stock-
holders of Newport Steel Corporation:
Certain negotiations of an exploratory nature have been
conducted, looking to a possible merger with Follansbee Steel
Corporation. Because of the uncertain international situation,
it is not now known what, if any, governmental restrictions
may be imposed upon the manufacture and sale of steel. The
Board of Directors have therefore decided that all such nego-
tiations be suspended for an indefinite period. 2
1
17 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 39b:
Q. Did you give Mr. Feldmann figures from which he could see the gain in
market price that he would have on his own shares if a merger with Fol-
lansbee were concluded on the basis suggested by Follansbee? A. Yes.
Q. How much paper profit would he have made if he had agreed to the
merger on the basis suggested by Mr. Follansbee? A. $712.000. (Excerpts
from Deposition of Harold J. Ruttenberg).
18 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 35b:
Q. I should like to ask you, first, whether Follansbee Steel Corporation
ever made an offer of merger to Newport Steel Corporation? A. We did not.
Q. Did Mr. Feldmann ever reject an offer of merger made by Follansbee
Steel Corporation? A. We did not make an offer of merger. (Excerpts from
Deposition of Marcus A. Follansbee).
19 See Defendants' Brief. supra note 2, at 35b:
Q. Was Mr. Feldmann the one who broke off merger negotiations? A. I
think they were suspended mutually.
Q. Was the suspension in August of 1950? A. This suspension was on.July
12, 1950.
See also Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 10, at I 14a:
A. I telephoned to him on July 12.
Q. What was the substance of your telephone conversation? A. I told hiri
that this was the position that the board took. that the board was willing and
anxious that we might continue negotiations with them. He said, "Well, that
is fine. Let's continue to exchange balance sheets and profit and loss state-
ments and maybe at some later date you will initiate or I may initiate some
further discussions."
Q. What did you say? A. I said I was perfectly willing to leave it that way.
(Excerpts from Deposition of Marcus A. Follansbee).
20 For the material in this paragraph, see Finding of Fact 47, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129
F. Supp. 162, 170.
21 Birnbaum Record, supra note I1. at 20. 21. See also Finding of Fact 49, Perlman v.
Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 170:
With the outbreak of the Korean War, there was a possibility that the
Government might advance the money to Newport to put in cold rolling
facilities on its own property and give Newport priorities to expedite the
construction, as was done in World War It
But cf Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 35b-36b, 211 b:
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During the late spring and early summer of 1950, Feldmann
received numerous inquiries from persons interested in a possible
purchase of his stock interest in Newport. One such inquiry, in
June or July of 1950, was from a Mr. Barney Hokin, the president
of International Rolling Mill Products Co., who asked if Feld-
mann would take $20 a share for his stock. Another inquiry was
from Ruttenberg, who on June 6, 1950, inquired whether Feld-
mann would accept $10 a share.22 Feldmann testified that, al-
though numerous calls were received by him after the com-
mencement of the Korean War, 23 they had no influence on his
decision to terminate the Follansbee negotiations.
24
On August 8, 1950, Sidney Coe of Irving Trust Company
called Feldmann on behalf of William J. Mericka. Mericka had
previously been substantially interested in Empire Steel Com-
pany. He was president of William J. Mericka & Co., investment
securities dealers in Cleveland, and was chairman of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Bingham-Herbrand Corporation. The latter
corporation was an "end user" of steel, i.e., a company requiring
steel for the manufacture of its products.
25
On August 9, Feldmann and William Alfs, a Vice-President of
Newport and Feldmann's personal counsel, met with Mericka and
Frank Cobourn in Detroit. Cobourn was a partner in a Toledo
law firm and counsel for A.P. Parts Corp., an end user of steel.
Q. At the meeting of July 5 and 6 or at the meeting of June 27, Mr.
Feldmann did not say anything along the line that because of the Korean
incident he might wish to withdraw from the merger negotiations? A. No, we
discussed the Korean situation and what possible effect it might have on both
of us, but there wasn.t any suggestion that we discontinue our discussions.
(Excerpts from Deposition of Marcus A. Follansbee).
Q. Now, isn't it also a fact that the outbreak of the Korean incident was
part of your calculations in deciding to suspend the Follansbee negotiations?
A. That was one of the reasons, yes. (Charles Russell Feldmann-For
Defendants- Cross).
22 For the material thus far in this paragraph, see Finding of Fact 50, Perlman v.
Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 170.
2 Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 211 b:
Q. All right, sir. Now, is it a fact that sometime after the outbreak of the
Korean episode, Mr. Feldmann, you were deluged with requests of people
who wanted to buy your shares? A. From time to time I had several
inquiries. And I think perhaps the Korean incident brought more of them.
Q. Is it true to say that after Korea, sometime around July perhaps and
early August you received numerous calls from brokers? A. Yes, sir.
(Charles Russell Feldmann- For Defendants-Cross).
24 Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 21 2b:
Q. Now did all of these inquiries that you were getting over the phone
from brokers and other people . have anything to do with your decision to
drop the Follansbee negotiations at that point? A. Absolutely not. (Charles
Russell Feldmann- For Defendants- Cross).
2 Finding of Fact 5 I, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 170.
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Mericka told Feldmann that he represented a group of end users
of steel which might be interested in acquiring all of Feldmann's
holdings in Newport Steel. Among members of the group were
Gibson Refrigerator Co. and Bingham-Herbrand. Feldmann in-
dicated that he might consider selling to such a group and said
that he would not consider less than $22 per share.
26
On August 9, 1950, the price of Newport's common stock was
quoted in the over-the-counter market at 81/4 bid, 9 asked.
Feldmann stated, however, that he thought the true value of the
stock was much higher than that.2 7 He talked again with represen-
tatives of the purchasing group on August 10, August 14, and
August 24, 1950.28
Mericka inspected the Newport plant on August 16 and re-
turned on August 22 with other members of the purchasing group,
as well as with Mr. James H. Hill, a top-flight operating man in
the steel industry. All were much impressed by Newport's steel
facilities.2
9
On August 24, Feldmann, in Chicago for a meeting with
Cobourn and Mericka, first went to two banks in order to inquire
about Frank Gibson, Charles Gibson, and Gibson Refrigerator
Co. Both banks issued very favorable reports about them. At the
Ambassador East Hotel, where Alfs, Cobourn and Mericka were
waiting, Mericka told Feldmann that he and Hill had both been
very impressed by Newport, but that payment for the minimum
number of shares that Feldmann was willing to sell would require
expansion of the purchasing group. While the group had not yet
been finally defined, Maytag Washing Machine Co. and Hudson
Motor Car Co. were designated as additional members, and
Feldmann was told that the group would be composed only of
responsible companies who were end users of steel. Mericka
offered $18 per share for approximately 400,000 shares on the
basis of a short-term option for half the stock and a thirty- to
sixty-day option for the other half. Feldmann refused the offer.
Cobourn then reported back to other members of the purchasing
group while Mericka remained with Feldmann. Mericka, after
talking with Cobourn on the telephone, offered Feldmann $20 per
share. Feldmann accepted this offer.30
28 Finding of Fact 52, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 170-71.
27 Finding of Fact 54, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 171.
28 Finding of Fact 55, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 17 1.
29 Finding of Fact 59, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 17 1.
30 Finding of Fact 63, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 172.
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For and in consideration of $100, receipt of which is ac-
knowledged, I agree to sell to you 200,000 shares of Newport
Steel Corporation for $4,000,000-at any time on or before
August 31, 1950.
If you exercise this option on or before Sept. 1, 1950, on
the terms above set forth, I will give you at that time an
option to buy an additional number of shares of Newport
Steel Corporation, not less than 175,000 shares nor more
than 200,000 shares at $20. per share, until 12:00 noon
E.S.T. Nov. 1, 1950.
If you exercise the option to buy the shares (minimum
175,000, maximum 200,000) on or before Nov. 1, 1950, I will
deliver to you, at the time you exercise the option, the resig-
nation of all the members of the Board of Directors of New-
port Steel Corpn.
(Signed) C. Russell Feldmann 3l
On August 29, 1950, the purchasing group organized a Dela-
ware corporation, Wilport Company ["Wilport"], and Mericka
assigned the option to it. Between August 24 and August 30,
1950, the purchasing group was expanded to comprise sixteen
members, all of them end users of steel. The group members paid
an aggregate of $8,200,000 to Wilport to enable it to exercise the
option, and received in return stocks and notes of Wilport. 32
On August 31, 1950, Feldmann went to Chicago, Illinois, and
at that time Wilport exercised the option. Feldmann delivered to
the Continental Illinois Bank 398,927 shares of Newport stock
and Continental delivered to Feldmann, unconditionally, checks
for $7,978,540 in payment of the stock.at $20 per share, and the
sale was completed.33
As of August 31, 1950, the 343,375' shares owned or con-
trolled, directly and/or indirectly by Feldmann and members of
his family, were apportioned as follows:3 4
Norman S. Feldmann ................................ 1,000
Raymond D. Feldmann .............................. 1,050
Charlotte M . Feldmann .............................. 2,000
11 Finding of Fact 65, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 172.
32 Finding of Fact 67, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 173.
33 Finding of Fact 70, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 173.
34 Finding of Fact 7, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162. 164.
FALL i1974]
16 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 8:1
John C . V ega .......................................... 600
Josephine V. Vega .................................... 600
Barbara Jane Feldmann .............................. 7,800
C arolyn F. O tto ....................................... 7,300
John F. O tto ........................................... 2,200
Phyllis F. McKee ..................................... 7,300
John V. McKee, Jr .................................... 2,525
Strong, Carlisle & Hammond Co.35 ..... . . . . . . . . . . 261,000
Henney Motor Co., Inc.36 ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 50,000
TOTAL 343,375
In addition to John V. McKee, Jr., Feldmann's son-in-law, the
other Newport directors, with the exception of Feldmann himself,
participated in the stock sale to Wilport by selling the following
numbers of shares at $20 per share:3 7
D. M. Shaeffer ........................................ 5,000
F. L. Taylor ........................................... 2,600
A . F. Lorenzen ....................................... 1,010
The balance was made up by the shares of numerous friends
and associates of Feldmann.38 In addition, F. L. Taylor sold some
35 See, in this connection, note 7 supra. See also Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at
162b:
Q. Now, had you previously aranged for certain employees of Newport
Steel or Strong, Carlisle and Hammond to buy shares of Newport Steel? A.
Yes.
Q. Had you loaned them the money or arranged for loans for them with
which to buy shares? A. Yes.
Q. And did you consider yourself under an obligation to allow these
employees to sell shares if you sold? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you permit these employees to sell their shares at $20? A. Yes.
Q. Did they sell all their shares? A. Yes. (Charles Russell Feldmann-
For Defendants- Direct).
36 See, in this connection, note 8 supra. See also Birnbaum Record. supra note 1I, at
54:
Henney Motor Company, Inc. is a personal holding company of C. Russell
Feldmann in which defendant Feldmann owns all the stock. It was in-
corporated in New York on November 22, 1933 as C. Russell Feldmann &
Co., Inc. and the name was changed to Henney Motor Company, Inc. on
May 22, 1946. The Certificate of Incorporation of Henney Motor Company,
Inc. provides that the office of the corporation shall be located in the City,
County and State of New York. (Affidavit of Nahum Birnbaum).
37 Finding of Fact 72, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 173.
38 Finding of Fact 71, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 173. See also Birnbaum
Record, supra note 1i, at 54:
Defendant Feldmann owned and controlled the stock of Newport which he
sold to Wilport through Henney Motor Company, Inc., Charlotte E. Fel-
dmann, Barbara Jane Feldmann, Joseph V. McKee, Jr., Phyllis M. McKee,
Carolyn Otto, D. M. Schaeffer, Lucille Shaeffer and R.J. Nixon. (Affidavit of
Nahum Birnbaum).
Lucille Shaeffer is the wife of D.M. Shaeffer, and R.J. Nixon is listed as
Treasurer and Controller of Newport Steel Corporation in Moody's In-
dustrial Manual 780 (1949).
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of the Newport shares owned by him to members of the
Feldmann family,3 9 as did others of the friends and associates,
some of whose shares Feldmann had delivered to the Continental
Illinois Bank.
40
After the consummation of the sale, Feldmann convened a
special meeting of Newport's board of directors. Three of Feld-
mann's co-directors- McKee, Lorenzen, and Sheaffer-were
present. Feldmann had with him the signed resignation of New-
port's fifth director, Taylor. Immediately prior to the meeting,
39 See Defendants' Brief, supra, note 2, at 160b-61b:
Q. Did you have conversations with Mr. Taylor with respect to the
purchase of any of his stock? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you tell us what those conversations were? A. Mr. Taylor was a
director of the corporation and one who I would see probably every other
day, and some weeks every day, and he lives in Greenwich, Connecticut. We
commute together sometimes. And he said that whatever I wanted to do was
entirely agreeable with him, but he wanted to sell all his other stock if I was
selling all of mine. It made no difference to him how much he sold at $20 or
how much he sold at whatever was a fair price or whatever I wanted to do.
Q. Well, what was the substance of the arrangements that you made with
Mr. Taylor? A. A portion of his holdings were sold at $20 and the balance
were sold to members of my family. I don't have the details in front of me.
Q. At what price? A. I think it was $10 or $11. 1 think it was $10 a share.
(Charles Russell Feldmann- For Defendants-Direct).
40 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 159b-60b:
Q. Now, did you have any conversations with Adam Sarver? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell us who Mr. Sarver is, his relationship with Newport Steel
and the substance of your conversation? A. Mr. Sarver is a gentleman about
84, 85 years old, a man worth about $15,000,000. He was one of the
founders of General Motors with W.C. Durant, and he was the founder of
the Universal Cooler Company, a man whom I have known for many years.
Q. Well, what was the substance of your conversation with Mr. Sarver? A.
I told Mr. Sarver- I can't remember the date, but it was sometime after the
24th, after I had executed the option, and I told him exactly what I had
planned to do. And he was the second largest stockholder in the Newport
Steel as a result of the merger of Universal Cooler into Newport Steel, and
he said that whatever I wanted to do, that is what he wanted to do,
And I told him that I had made a commitment to sell. 400,000 shares of
stock, and I did not know exactly how many shares would be represented by
my business associates and my family, and a few close friends and business
associates, people with whom I have done business.
He said, "Well, whatever you want to do, Russ, is perfectly all right with
me. It makes no difference to me, but I want to sell my stock if you sell
yours."
Q. Did he say whether he wanted to sell all of his stock or part of his stock
or some of his stock? A. He said, "However you arrange it." He said, "I
want to sell all of my stock whether you buy it or who buys it, I want to sell
all of my stock if you are selling all of yours."
Q. What did you say to Mr. Sarver? What arrangements did you make
with Mr. Sarver with respect to his holding of Newport Sreel? A. I told Mr.
Sarver, I asked Mr. Sarver if it would be agreeable to him if he were to sell
20 - 5,000 shares of stock at $20 and members of my family would take
,another 27 or 2,300 shares at $ 10 and the balance of the stock I would take
at any price he wanted to sell it for.
He said he was coming to New York in two or three weeks, and he said,
"When I get there I intend to visit with you as I always have" and he said
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Feldmann was for the first time informed of the identity of the full
slate of directors proposed by Wilport.
41
After the meeting was convened, the directors of Newport
successively resigned and, as each vacancy arose, the Board
elected the new directors. Each of these directors was a director
of Wilport.
42
At the meeting of Newport's board of directors on August 31,
1950, Feldmann also resigned in his capacity of chairman of the
board and president of Newport.
43
Under date of September 14, 1950, Frank S. Gibson, as presi-
dent of Newport, sent a letter describing these events to the
stockholders. 44 In addition, the following steps were taken in
connection with Newport's contracts with the City, County, and
State of New York:
"On September 20, 1950, at a regular meeting held in Newport,
Kentucky, the Board of Directors of Newport Steel Corporation
amended Section 3 of Article IV of the by-laws of said Corpo-
ration to provide that regular meetings of the Board of Directors
should be held at Newport, Kentucky, rather than at 4606 Chrys-
ler Building, New York City, New York!451 In addition, the fol-
"We will talk about it at that time." (Charles Russell Feldmann- For De-
fendants- Direct).
See also Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 16 Ib-62b:
Q. Now, did you have any conversations with Mr. McNeil? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell us what the conversations were and who Mr McNeil was. A. Mr.
McNeil was President of the Universal Cooler Company at the time of the
merger, and after the merger he became General Manager of the Universal
Cooler Division of Newport Steel Corporation. At the time of the merger
Mr. McNeil wanted to own more stock than he would have after the merger.
I loaned Mr. McNeil $85,000 to buy some of his stock. I arranged the loan
with one of my banks and guaranteed it personally. The loan continued for
about a year, a year and a half, I don't recall.But it was some period of time.
I told Mr. McNeil-well, in the meantime Mr. McNeil, by mutual agree-
ment, he resigned as director in about 1947 or '48, and also as General
Manager of the division, and he bought a spall business for himself.
Q. What was the substance of your conversations, if there were any? A. I
told him exactly what I was doing, and I told him I was selling my stock, and
at the price I was selling it at. And he said, "Well, Russell, anything you want
to do. If you want to take me in or take me out for part of my stock at $20
and buy the balance of my stock," he said, "that is entirely agreeable with
m e. "
Q. What were the arrangements, if any, that you made with Mr. McNeil?
A. Mr. McNeil- I had forgotten the number of shares that he was taking out
at $20 and the balance was bought from him at $10 a share. (Charles Russell
Feldmann- For Defendants- Direct).
41 Finding of Fact 74, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 173-74. The slate
consisted of Frank Gibson, Mericka, Cobourn, Paxton, and Mitchell. Feldmann knew that
Paxton was a member of a well-known, reputable, Chicago law firm and general counsel to
Gibson Refrigerator Co., ind Alfs had previously spoken favorably of him. Id.
4 Findings of Fact 74, 75, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 174.
43 Finding of Fact 76, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 174.
4Finding of Fact 121, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 179.
45 See note 65 infra.
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lowing two resolutions were unanimously adopted by said Board
of Directors at the same meeting:
RESOLVED, that the Treasurer, Mr. H.E. Hamilton be
and he is authorized to dispose of the furniture and equipment
of the corporation located in the New York office at the best
price obtainable, not less, however, than $3,000.00 in the
aggregate.
RESOLVED, that the Treasurer, Mr. H.E. Hamilton, take
such steps and execute and deliver such sub-leases, assign-
ments, and other instruments as shall be necessary to
sub-lease, assign or otherwise dispose of the office space in
the Chrysler Building, New York City, New York, now un-
der lease to the corporation; to the end that the corporation
may be relieved of the obligation of continuing to maintain
such space after September 30, 1950....
"In the latter part of September, 1950, the corporation closed
out its account with Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company,
New York City, New York, and the lease to the corporation of
space in the Chrysler Building, 405 Lexington Avenue, New
York, New York, Rooms 4606-11, was terminated with the les-
sor's consent, and on September 30, 1950, this space was leased
to Strong, Carlisle & Hammond Company....
"On or about September 30, 1950, the name of Newport Steel
Corporation was removed from the door of Room 4606, and from
the Chrysler Building Directory....
"On or about October 4, 1950, the office equipment, located in
the aforesaid space, and owned by the corporation, was disposed
of and sold to Strong, Carlisle & Hammond Company....
"On or about October 5, 1950, the New York Telephone
Company was directed to and did remove the name of the corpo-
ration from its listing at the above address and did transfer New-
port Steel Corporation's former New York City telephone num-
ber, Murray Hill 9-4392, to Strong, Carlisle & Hammond Com-
pany." 46
Under date of November 6, 1950, Ruttenberg wrote to the
officers and directors of Newport Steel Corporation, suggesting
that negotiations with Follansbee be re-opened, 47 a suggestion
46 Birnbaum Record, supra note 1I, at 36-38 (Affidavit of Frank M. Cobourn).
47 Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 10, at 178a-79a (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 38):
Dear Sirs:
It has been over two months since you purchased control of the Newport
Steel Corporation and became the new directors. When your predecessor
directors resigned there was pending before them a merger proposal from the
Follansbee Steel Corporation. Two 9f your directors, Messrs. W.J. Mericka
and F.M. Cobourn, were prompt in exploring this proposal by meeting for
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that he testified was rejected on the same grounds that had pre-
vented the earlier discussions from reaching a successful con-
clusion.
48
Under date of January 19, 1951, a proxy statement was sent to
Newport's shareholders, informing them that the Board of Direc-
tors consisted of Frank S. Gibson, Jr., Frank M. Cobourn, Wil-
liam J. Mericka, Bernard A. Mitchell, and George H. Roderick.
49
The statement also noted that:
Wilport Company is a corporation owned by a group of
manufacturing companies, all of whom use steel in their own
manufacturing operations. Beginning with small quantities in
the month of October, 1950, and increasing to substantial
tonnages in later months as Newport Steel Corporation was
able to supply steel to the manufacturing companies who are
stockholders of Wilport Company, sales of steel to such com-
panies have been made. Such sales have been at the estab-
lished mill prices of Newport Steel Corporation, and on its
regular terms of payments.50
At the annual meeting of Newport's shareholders, held on
February 19, 1951, the following resolutions were adopted:
Resolved, by the shareholders of Newport Steel Corpo-
ration, that the action of the officers and directors in author-
izing and approving the sale and delivery from time to time of
half a day on September thirteenth last with the principal officers and direc-
tors of Follansbee Steel, following which Mr. Mericka made an inspection
tour of Follansbee's rolling mill and fabricating facilities in Follansbee, West
Virginia on October nineteenth last. The purpose of this communication is to
urge you to enter into serious discussions with Follansbee Steel, such as your
predecessors held on July fifth and sixth, 1950, and before and.after these
dates, with a view toward effecting a merger between Newport Steel and
Follansbee Steel.
No doubt by now you are fairly well acquainted with the Newport Steel
properties at Newport, Kentucky. As they are presently constituted, they are
non-competitive, and will be the first to suffer from any drop in the demand
for steel below capacity levels. ...
See also Defendants' Briefsupra note 2, at 37b:
Q. I am not now referring to the negotiations which took place under Mr.
Feldmann's regime, but to your latest suggestion to Newport made to the
new Newport management. A. Well, the new Newport management objected
to consolidation around the same fundamental point that kept the previous
discussions from coming to a fruitful conclusion, namely, the high value at
which Follansbee Steel Corporation has its subsidiary, the Federal Enamel
and Stamping Company on its books. (Excerpts from Deposition of Harold J.
Ruttenberg).
48 Id.
49 George H. Roderick. was Vice-President and director of American Seating Co., of
Grand Rapids, Michigan, one of Wilport's contributors and stockholders. See Plaintiffs'
Brief, supra note 10, at 198a (Consolidated Amended Complaint).
50 Finding of Fact 123, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 180.
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steel produced by this corporation, at its then prevailing mill
prices, to stockholders of Wilport Company, be, and the same
hereby is ratified, approved and confirmed.
Resolved, by the shareholders of Newport Steel Corpo-
ration, that all the acts of officers and directors of this corpo-
ration since the date of the last annual shareholders' meeting




In an agreement with Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation
(controlled by Louis E. Wolfson), dated December 18, 1953,
Wilport agreed to transfer its controlling interest in Newport to
Merritt-Chapman & Scott by an exchange of one share of Mer-
ritt-Chapman & Scott common stock for each 2.1 shares of New-
port common stock. The transfer was contingent on Mer-
ritt-Chapman & Scott making a general offer on the same basis to
all Newport shareholders and acceptance of that offer by holders
of 662/3 percent of Newport's outstanding shares. The price of
Merritt-Chapman & Scott common stock at the date of the offer
was approximately $22 per share, thereby yielding Wilport and
other Newport shareholders about $10.50 per share. Early in
1954, Merritt-Chapman & Scott succeeded in acquiring 94.7 per-
cent of Newport's stock on the basis of this offer.
52
"There was a time, early in the [1950's], when Louis Elwood
Wolfson looked to many like the prototype of the new kind of
self-made multimillionaire who was turning up all over the busi-
ness landscape. He showed a nose for capital gains, ,and brains
and daring in putting together deals, so that even in an era of high
personal-income taxes he was able to accumulate huge for-
tunes."
5 3
The basis for Wolfson's success was a series of timely corpo-
rate acquisitions. In an article entitled "The Man Who Wants
Montgomery Ward," Business Week magazine summarized the
ideology that underlay the campaigns for shareholder approval
required by many of those acquisitions:
51 Finding of Fact 125, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 180-8 1.
52 For the material in this paragraph, see SEC PROSPECTUS OF MERRITT-CHAPMAN &
SCOTT CORPORATION, dated January 27,1954; MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2646
(1955); 1953 and 1954 ANNUAL REPORTS OF MERRITT-CHAPMAN & SCOTT CORPORATION
at 19 and 24, respectively.
53 Hammer, Why Things Went Sour for Louis Wolfson, 64 FORTUNE 132 (Sept., 196 1).
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Wolfson vows he wants Ward mostly because it offers him
his best chance to complete a major task he has set for
himself: to assure that the American stockholder gets the
kind of treatment from American management that Wolfson
thinks he should have.
Wolfson thinks-as do some others-that it's a disgrace
that there are only. 6.5-million stockholders in the U.S. He's
convinced this is due primarily to a profound lack of public
confidence in the way U.S. management handles the in-
vestor's money.
He doesn't like stock option plans, and he thinks executive
pensions are much less tightly controlled than they should be.
He thinks every officer ought to be required to put at least a
year's pay in his company's stock-at the stock's market
price, not at a cut rate. He believes that the best thing man-
agement can do with earnings is to disburse them to stock-
holders "after prudent lay-aside for operations, reserve and
development. 54
By July 18, 1957-the dateline of the New York Times story





The 1950 Newport Annual Report sent to its stockholders
under date of January 19, 1951, included the following paragraph:
Suits by Stockholders:
Several civil actions have been filed and are pending, which
are derivative actions brought by stockholders on behalf of
the Corporation. None of them seeks recovery of money
from the Corporation. Some of them seek to recover for the
Corporation a part of the price realized by the former Presi-
dent and other stockholders from the sale of certain Common
Stock of the Corporation.56
The conclusions of law arrived at by the District Court on
remand (in the opinion reported in the New York Times story
quoted in part A(i), supra), are as follows:
54 Bus. WEEK 172, 174 (Oct. 2, 1954).
55 Finding of Fact 2, Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436.
56 Finding of Fact 124, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 180.
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"The difference between $14.67 and the $20 per share received
by the defendants constituted a premium or bonus paid by Wilport
Company for control over Newport's output Of steel.
"The bonuses or premiums of $5.33 per share for the 398,927
shares sold by the individual defendants (i.e., those other than
Newport Steel Corporation, now Newcorp, Inc) -to the Wilport
Company total $2,126,280.91. The Wilport Company shares,
which are barred by the judgment of the Court of Appeals from
recovery in this proceedings, constituted 36.99% of the out-
standing shares of Newport. This percentage of the $2,126,280.91
amounts to $786,511.29 which, deducted from the $2,126,280.91,
leaves $1,339,769.62 due by the individual defendants to the
plaintiffs and those whom they represent, i.e., the present holders
of the shares of Newport outstanding on August 31, 1950, other
than the present holders of any of the shares then transferred to
the Wilport Company; the plaintiffs and such qualified present
holders of shares will take in proportion to the number of shares
each holds.
"Judgment may enter for the plaintiffs and those whom they
represent to recover from the defendants the sum of
$1,339,769.62 with interest at 6% per annum from August 31,
1950, and their costs.
"An order will subsequently issue appointing a special master
to determine who, in accordance with the terms of the judgment
to be entered on this Memorandum, are the particular persons
which or whom the plaintiffs represent and the portion of the
judgment to which each is entitled."
57
(ii)
On or about September 20, 1950, Howard Cagle, a stock-
holder, sent the following letter to Frank S. Gibson, Jr., President
of Newport:
Dear Mr. Gibson:
For more time than I care to remember, I have owned 450
shares of stock in the Company which you recently became
President of, now known as Newport Steel.
While I am glad to see that your attitude is to issue pe-
riodical reports (and I certainly had trouble getting any in-
formation out of Mr. Feldman [sic] there are still a number of
things I would like to know more about. For instance:
" Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436, 446-47.
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What did Feldman [sic] and his family get for his
stock?
Would it have not been better if the Company had
accepted the Follinsbee [sic] deal? (I understand I
would have gotten around $16 a share for my
stock on that deal)
Is Feldman [sic] still connected with the Com-
pany?
Who and what is the Wilport Company?
Who are the owners?
Have any changes been made by your group in the
operation of the steel plant?
What are the prospects for a dividend?
I am sorry to be taking up your valuable time this way, but
I would appreciate it if you would give me the information
asked for above.5 8
On November 17, 1950, a complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York on
behalf of Nahum Birnbaum, Morris J. Lutterman and Hana D.
Lutterman, co-partners, doing.business under the firm name and
style of Birnbaum & Co. (with offices at 60 Broad Street), suing
58 Glenn G. Paxton, Secretary of Newport, sent the following reply, dated October 2,
1950, to Mr. Cagle:
Your letter of September 20th addressed to Mr. Frank S. Gibson, Jr.,
President, has been referred to me for reply. Some of your questions relate to
matters in which the corporation is not involved. The others, I am glad to
answer.
Mr.Feldmann is no longer connected with the corporation as an officer,
director or employee. No drastic changes have been made in the operation of
the steel plant during the past month, but prices were increased on Septem-
ber 8th; every reasonable effort is being made to increase production and to
bring the operations of some of the steel making facilities more nearly to
rated capacity; and consideration will be given to the problem of what can be
done to make the steel plant more nearly competitive under normal condi-
tions.
With respect to the "'Follansbee Deal" which you mentioned, I have no
first-hand information on the subject but I note that in Mr. Feldmann's letter
to stockholders dated August 3rd it was stated that negotiations had been
discontinued. From what I have heard a possible merger had been discussed,
which I assumed involved an exchange for stock. I doubt that the merger
would have provided for the payment of any cash to stockholders of either
Company, but this is merely an assumption since I do not know what the
negotiations were. It seems quite doubtful that the merger of the two com-
panies would have accomplished very much in the way of making the surviv-
ing company an integrated competitive producer.
In my opinion, dividends in the near future are unlikely. Heavy capital
acquisition of new steel making facilities in recent years, the failure of the
steel division during the first ten months of the current fiscal year to realize
profits, and other factors have adversely affected the Company's working
capital position. It seems clear that the payment of dividends will have to be
postponed until the Company's capital position is improved.
See Birnbaum Record, supra note 1I, at 25-27 (Exhibits C and D, annexed to Complaint).
Perlman v. Feldmann
on their own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated stock-
holders of Newport Steel Corporation, and on behalf of Newport
Steel Corporation. The opinion of the District Court summarized
the complaint as follows:
"Two causes of action are alleged, one a derivative action
brought on behalf of the Newport Steel Corporation, the other a
class action brought by plaintiffs as representatives of all the
stockholders of Newport similarly situated. Jurisdiction is alleged
to exist in this court by virtue of §§ 27 and 29 of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78aa and 78cc.
"In substance, the complaint alleges that defendant Feldmann,
who was president and chairman of the board of directors of
Newport, a manufacturer of steel, controlled Newport through
ownership or control of 40% of its stock; that defendants
Stamm,59 Rheim, 60 Rohr,6 1 Lorenzen, Sheaffer and Ballantyne,
6 2
as directors of Newport,6 3 acted under the control of Feldmann,
and that in August 1950, defendant Feldmann rejected an offer of
Follansbee Steel for a merger on terms profitable to Newport.
Feldmann rejected the Follansbee offer, the complaint alleges,
because he intended to sell his stock in Newport to defendant
Wilport Company, at $22 a share, twice the market value, thereby
obtaining for himself an opportunity that should have accrued to
the corporation. The excess, it is claimed, was paid for the control
of Newport.
"It is further alleged that Feldmann violated Rule X-10B-5
when he reported by letter to Newport stockholders about the
negotiations with Follansbee but failed to disclose his personal
interest in its rejection. In addition, there are allegations that
59C.H. Stamm was listed as a director of Newport Steel Corporation and
Vice-President and General Manager of the Newport Rolling Mill Division in Moody's
Industrial Manual 780 (1949). But see note 63 infra; note 45 and accompanying text
supra.
60 J.E. Rheim was listed as a director of Newport Steel Corporation and Vice-President
and General Manager of the Refrigeration and Radio Division in Moody's Industrial
Manual 780 (1949). But see note 63 infra; note 45 and accompanying text supra.61F.H. Rohr was listed as a director of Newport Steel Corporation in Moody's In-
dustrial Manual 780 (1949). But see note 63 infra; note 45 and accompanying text supra.
62J. Ballantyne was listed as a director of Newport Steel Corporation in Moody's
Industrial Manual 780 (1949). See also Birnbaum Record, supra note I1, at 40 (Affidavit
of Frank M. Cobourn subscribed and sworn to January 12, 1951): "John Ballantyne is
deceased."
63 The 1949 Annual Report of Newport Steel Corporation For Year Ended October 31,
1949, which contains a President's Letter to the Shareholders dated March I, 1950, lists
the Directors as C. Russell Feldmann, Chairman, A.F. Lorenzen, Joseph V. McKee, Jr.,
D.M. Sheaffer, and Frank L. Taylor. The Report also lists General Offices at 9th and
Lowell Streets, Newport, Kentucky, and Executive Offices at 405 Lexington Avenue,
New York 17, New York.
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Feldmann and the other directors resigned pursuant to the terms
of the sale to Wilport; and that Wilport, a corporation owned by
ten large users of steel, was using, and intending to use, Newport
as a "captive" subsidiary. Plaintiffs ask that all defendants, save
Newport, be directed to account, that defendants Wilport, Gib-
son, Mericka, Mitchell, Coboum and Paxton, directors and
officers of Wilport, be enjoined from causing Newport to sell
exclusively to Wilport; and that the sale of Feldmann's stock be
declared void."
6 4
On January 10, 1951, defendant C. Russell Feldmann moved
for judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.
On the same date, defendant Wilport made a similar motion,
including as grounds lack of jurisdiction over its person65 and
improper venue. Defendant Newport's motion, made five days
later, cited failure to state a claim and improper venue as grounds
for dismissal. On May 29, 1951, Hon. Samuel H. Kaufman grant-
ed the motions on the following ground:
"Even if it be assumed, without deciding, that the facts alleged
amount to a fraud upon the minority stockholders of Newport,
plaintiffs may not have their remedy in this court, since jurisdic-
64 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.. 98 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j)(b), renders it
unlawful, in interstate commerce or through the mails:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942), makes it unlawful, in interstate commerce or
through the mails:
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
65 See Birnbaum Record, supra note 11, at 33 (Affidavit of Glenn G. Paxton):
Deponent further says that Wilport Company is a corporation organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware; that
said corporation was not at any time prior hereto and is not now found in the
State of New York or in the Southern District of New York; that said
corporation was not at any time prior hereto nor is it now an inhabitant of the
State of New York or the Southern District of the State of New York; that
said corporation has not at any time prior hereto nor does it now transact any
business in the State of New York or in the Southern District of New York;
and that said corporation has not at any time prior hereto performed nor is it
now performing any act or transaction the State of New York or in the
Southern District of New York.
See also note 45 and accompanying text supra.
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tion in this case is not predicated upon diversity of citizenship,
and plaintiffs have not shown a violation of § 10(b) and the Rule
effectuating it, X- 1OB-5....
• ..The previously existing rules against fraud in the
purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers.
The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against
fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting in-
dividuals or companies from buying securities if they engage
in fraud in their purchase. * * *
"The essence of the complaint in this case is that the sale by
Feldmann of his Newport stock constituted a fraud on Newport's
minority stockholders, not that it was a fraud on the purchaser of
the stock."
66
On June 22, 195 1, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. In addition
to arguments on the question of whether Rule X-10B-5 should or
should not apply, Newport and Wilport reiterated-in their briefs
in the Court of Appeals- their argument concerning the question
of venue: that a provision of federal law permitting a stock-
holder's suit to "be prosecuted in any judicial district where the
corporation might have sued the same defendants" was satisfied
only if allof the defendants named in the complaint could be sued
in the district in which the suit is brought. In support of its
statutory construction argument, Newport cited (and reproduced
in an Appendix) the unpublished opinion in the case of Mernoff v.
Ballantyne,67 which had been filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut on May 31, 1951, and in
which Newport's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue was granted in an order dated July 13, 1951.
Hon. C.C. Hincks summarized the facts which formed the
basis of his opinion in Mernoff v. Ballantyne as follows:
The defendant Newport Steel Corporation (hereinafter
called Newport) the beneficiary, or allegedly injured, corpo-
ration in this stockholder's derivative action, moves to dis-
miss on the grounds of improper venue. The complaint shows
that the plaintiff is a citizen of New York and a stockholder in
Newport; that Newport is an Indiana corporation; and that
neither of the other two corporate defendants and none of the
individual defendants are citizens or residents of New York.
Further than this, the complaint does not specify as to the
citizenship of the defendants. However, an affidavit submitted
66 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.. 98 F. Supp. 506, 508-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
67 Civil Action No. 3322 (D.Conn 1951).
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by the Treasurer of Newport, not controverted by the
plaintiff, shows that three, and three only, of the sixteen
named individual defendants are residents of Connecticut,
and that none of the three defendant corporations, including
Newport, is incorporated in Connecticut or has been licensed
to do business or is doing business in Connecticut. The only
defendants thus far served with process are Feldmann, an
individual who is a citizen of Connecticut, and Newport, the
injured corporation.
68
In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, a panel
consisting of Augustus N. Hand (who wrote), Learned Hand
(retired), and Chief Judge Thomas W. Swan affirmed the District
Court judgment in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., and fol-
lowed its reasoning in an opinion which concluded that:
[Sjection 16(b) of the Acts of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b),
expressly gave the corporate issuer or its stockholders a right
of action against corporate insiders using their position to
profit in the sale or exchange of corporate securities. The
absence of a similar provision in Section 10(b) strengthens
the conclusion that that section was directed solely at that
type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually asso-
ciated with the sale or purchase of securites rather than at
fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule
X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser
or seller. Since the complaint failed to allege that any of the
plaintiffs fell within either class, the judgment of the district
court was correct and is accordingly affirmed.
69
A petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court
of the United States on April 9, 1952. The petition stated that the
Second Circuit decision was "in direct conflict with a decision of
a District Court in the Third Circuit, McManus v. Jessup &
Moore Paper Co., Civil No. 8015 (E.D. Pa. 1948), '"70 and con-
cluded that:
The decision of the Court below opens a great loophole
through which corporate fiduciaries may defraud their minor-
68 Brief for Appellee at 13, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir.
1952). See also id. at 9-10.
69 Bimbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2 Cir. 1952).
70 Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 7, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 343 U.S. 956
(1952). See also Birnbaum v. Newport Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 195 1):
With the exception of one case, decided without opinion [McManus v. Jessup
& Moore Paper Co., Civ. No. 8015 (E.D. Pa. 1948)], none of the authorities




ity stockholders. Even if the common law were to provide
adequate substantive remedies in a situation such as this, the
jurisdictional problems which the Act was meant to avoid are
insuperable in a state court action. The securities statutes,
with their provisions for nation-wide service of process, were
intended to protect scattered security holders who could not
protect themselves because of the inadequacies of state court
jurisdiction. This case is exactly the situation which the stat-
ure was meant to cure. The defendants herein are residents of
states from Maine to California .... Newport is an In-
diana corporation allegedly not presently doing business in
New York. . . . Wilport is a Delaware corporation ...
Feldmann lives in New York. 71 . . . The other stockholders
are scattered all over the country, and an over-the-counter
market exists in Newport's shares .... It would be impos-
sible to bring all necessary parties before a court and to
obtain full determination of the allegations of the complaint,
except pursuant to the statutory provisions of § 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act, which provide for nation-wide ser-
vice of process.
No such gap in the area of regulation was intended to exist
by Congress. It is for this reason that § 10(b) was phrased as
a "catch-all" provision intended to grant protection to the
public and investors against all types of fraud. Neither
§ 10(B) nor Rule X-10B-5 should be bound by the strict
construction given them by the Court below....
Before the broadly remedial purpose of Congress to grant
protection to the public and investors against all types of
fraud is limited in accordance with the decision below, this
Court should rule on the question. The issue herein is one of
great public importance, since it will determine whether in-
vestors have any effective remedy against fraud by a fiduciary
in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.
72
The petition was denied on May 26, 1952. 7a
71 See Birnbaum Record, supra note 1I, at 53, 54 (Affidavit of Nahum Birnbaum):
I am informed and believe that the only office maintained by defendant
Feldmann for the transaction of business was and is in the Southern District
of New York. The address, room number and telephone number of the
Southern District offices of Newport Steel Corporation and defendant
Feldmann were at all times mentioned in the complaint herein the same. Both
were at 4606 Chrysler Building, 405 Lexington Avenue, Murray Hill 9-4392.
Charlotte E. Feldmann is the wife of C. Russell Feldmann and resides
with him at the Hotel Pierre, Fifth Avenue and 61st Street in the Southern
District of New York.
72 Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at I 1-12, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 343 U.S.
956 (1952).
73 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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(iii)
On November 13, 1951, in the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut in New Haven, Conn., with Hon.
Carroll C. Hincks, Chief Judge, serving as trial judge, trial began
in the case of Perlman v. Feldmann and Newport Steel Corp.
which had been filed on October 2, 1950.
74
A letter dated October 28, 1950, was sent by Glenn G. Paxton
as Secretary of Newport Steel Corporation to lawyers represent-
ing a group of shareholders. 75 Paxton's letter responded in the
following terms to the letter they had addressed to Newport Steel
Corporation and certain members of its Board of Directors:
"You and your clients are evidently laboring under certain
misapprehensions of fact, which we wish to correct. The owners
of Wilport Company have not purchased, and have no intention of
purchasing, steel from Newport at an inadequate price or at a
price lower than the price asked by Newport and its competitors
from other customers. Currently, Newport is asking and obtaining
a higher price for its steel than is being charged by any com-
parable competitor, regardless of size, and it is the intention of the
management to continue to establish prices at levels which will
result in profitable operations. Incidentally, one of the first steps
taken by the present management early in September, 1950, was
to increase the prices of its steel products in practically all cate-
gories to the extent of $10.00 per ton. Any notion which your
clients may have that Newport has been or will be deprived of
large profits from the sale of its production is simply not in
accordance with the facts....
"Contrary to the allegation contained in your letter, the entire
output of Newport has not been and will not be diverted to the
owners of Wilport. . . . They will constitute stable, long-term
customers of Newport, which, because of their financial interest
in Newport, will bolster rather than hurt Newport's position if and
when a buyer's market may develop in steel....
"Newport has not sold its steel and does not propose to sell its
steel on the grey market for the reason that such action is, in the
opinion of the management, contrary to the public interest and
74 The case had been filed on October 2, 1950. On December 11, 1950, the case of
Perlman v. Newport Steel Corp. was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, the state in which the defendant was incorporated.
75 Arthur Kramer, Inger Lawrence, Muriel Lawrence, A. Charles Lawrence, Edith
Lawrence, and James J. Lawrence, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
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contrary to the long-range financial interests of Newport and its
shareholders....
"... We suggest that you investigate these matters further be-
fore resorting to the suggested 'legal remedies', which we believe
are unwarranted, unnecessary and not in the best interests of
Newport or of its stockholders including your clients.'
7 5
On March 26, 1951, these shareholders filed an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut,
against-in addition to Newport Steel Corporation, C. Russell
Feldmann and Charlotte E. Feldmann, who had been named as
defendants in the action instituted in the name of Jane Perl-
man-Joseph V. McKee, Jr., Carolyn Otto, Phyllis M. McKee,
and Barbara Jane Feldmann. 77
On May 28, 1951, an order was entered consolidating the two
actions. Perlman's action had already been consolidated, on Feb-
ruary 5, 195 1, with an action filed in the name of Emily Reumert
on January 18, 1951, against the same parties being sued in the
name of Jane Perlman. 7 8 On September 13, 195 1, Harry Mernoff,
whose suit had been dismissed by the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut in an order dated July 13,
1951, 79 was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff.80 The
76 Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 10, at 237a-40a (Exhibit 2 Annexed to Answer of
Defendant, Newport Steel Corporation, to Supplemental Consolidated Complaint).
77 A suit by these plaintiffs was also filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on November 8, 1950.
78 An action filed by Reumert in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York on December 28, 1950, was stayed by consent of the parties.
See generally Finding of Fact 131, Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 182
(D.Conn. 1952):
131. Demand by plaintiffs upon the stockholders of Newport to bring this
suit would have been futile because:
(a) Under the laws of Indiana, Burns' Annotated Indiana Stats. 1948,
§ 25-208, the directors and not the stockholders manage the affairs of New-
port, including the bringing of action for it. The stockholders as a body
cannot by resolution manage Newport or compel its management to bring
suit.
"(b) Compliance by Newport's management with a stockholders' resolu-
tion to bring this action would have left the conduct of the action in hostile
hands and it could not have been properly prosecuted.
(c) Efforts to secure action by Newport's stockholders would require a
proxy fight with Newport's management. The management controls approxi-
mately 37% of Newport's outstanding stock. The remaining stock of New-
port is widely dispersed among several thousand shareholders whose identity
changes from day to day. The management is in control of Newport's proxy
machinery. An attempt by plaintiffs to displace Newport's management
would have been unavailing.
7 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
a0 An action brought by him in the New York Supreme Court, New York County, and
served upon one of the defendants January 31, 1951, was subsequently dismissed.
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general counsel for all plaintiffs in the suit was the New York City
law firm of Pomerantz, Levy, Schreiber & Haudek.
The trial concluded on November 30, 1951, and final judgment
was entered on December 8, 1952. In his opinion, Judge Hincks
defined and analyzed the issues requiring decision as follows:
"It is the plaintiffs' claim that the sale of stock, with an accom-
panying transfer of Newport's corporate offices to Wilport's nomi-
nees, constituted a breach of Feldmann's fiduciary duties to the
corporation which resulted in "profits" to the defendants for
which they are accountable to Newport. And to understand what
the plaintiffs mean by 'profits' in the context of this case one must
have in mind that the challenged transaction occurred some time
after our national entrance into the Korean enterprise as a result
of which there was a 'short' or 'gray' market in steel. In that
situation steel producers were in a position to exact for their
product from hungry end-users of steel a price premium over and
above prices fixed on the basis of mill costs. There was then no
'black' market because at the time sales at a premium were not
illegal. There was, however, a 'gray' market in which sales were
made at premiums. This market, out of patriotic considerations,
reputable producers (and so far as the record shows Newport
qualified for this classification) declined to enter: without legal
compulsion they agreed to forego their advantage and to sell at
not above posted prices which tied in with their respective mill
costs. The plaintiffs say they have no criticism of Feldmann's
management of Newport for its self-restraint in this respect. But
they contend that, since Feldmann's sale of a control block was to
a group of end-users of steel, who were thus enabled to divert
Newport's production to themselves, at a price allegedly in excess
of the value of the stock but for the effect of the gray market, this
excess of value which was covered into the purchase price re-
ceived by Feldmann (and his associates) was in effect a gray
market premium and constituted a 'profit' on a 'corporate asset'
wrongfully diverted from the corporation into Feldmann's in-
dividual pocket.
"The defendants deny that there has been a breach of any duty
owed to Newport. It is their position that the transaction in
question was merely a sale of a block of stock with the rights and
powers attaching thereto. They assert also that if any of Feld-
mann's acts as an officer or director are in issue, these acts were
ratified by vote of the shareholders at Newport's annual meeting
on February 19, 1951 and therefore cannot now be made the
basis of an action by the corporation.
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"On analysis it will be seen that the basic question in the case
is one of law. In the state of the steel market as it existed on
August 31, 1950, was the admitted power inherent in a control
block of corporate stock to control the distribution of Newport's
product and to select those who may become its customers a
corporate asset as the plaintiffs contend, or was it something
properly pertaining to the ownership of a control block of stock
the value of which was necessarily and properly reflected in the
value of the stock as the defendants contend?. .81
"Where a stockholder has power through his control of man-
agement to control distribution of the corporate product, whether
he exercises his power or leaves it in abeyance, or whether he
transfers it with his stock to another, the corporate balance sheet
is not thereby affected. To view the power in management, or in
a stockholder through his control over management, to select the
customers of the company as a corporate asset in itself, is to
indulge in a confusion of thinking which would introduce unset-
tling confusion throughout the world of commerce. For the power
to select customers if an asset is one having value only because it
carries ability to command a premium price for the corporate
product-a condition obtaining only in a seller's market when
demand exceeds supply: in a buyers' market no such condition
exists. What chaos would ensue if a corporate balance sheet to
have precise definition required adjustment for every shift in the
balance between supply and demand-and if, to determine the
rights of a corporation vis-h-vis a particular stockholder, it were
necessary to determine not only the balance between demand and
supply for the corporate product but also whether the particular
block of stock involved, considered for its relation to the current
distribution of all the stock, carried practical control of the corpo-
ration!
"The plaintiffs' repeatedly expressed assumption that in the
situation here the power to control the corporate distribution was
a corporate asset is scarcely consistent with their prayer that the
defendants be required to pay over the consideration therefor not
to the corporation for the benefit of all stockholders but instead to
stockholders exclusive of Wilport, the largest stockholder of all.
Nor is such an assumption supported either by citation of author-
ity or by reason. Even assuming that the price received by
Feldmann reflected the value of the power to control distribution
of the corporate product, it is fallacious to argue that the sale
81 Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D.Conn. 1952).
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cloaked a gray market transaction whereby Feldmann, whose
management led Newport to forego premium prices on its product
which it might have obtained for the benefit of all stockholders,
obtained individually the equivalent of a price premium in capital-
ized form for.the benefit only of the minority stockholders who
owned the control block. If members of the Wilport group in gray
market transactions had merely bought steel from Newport at a
premium they would have remained free from responsibility for
producing steel and all the hazards which attend the steel in-
dustry. Instead, by a capital investment they made a long-range
commitment to the production of steel and accepted the attendant
vicissitudes. This feature of the transaction takes it outside the
gray market ... ",82
"From this it follows that the price received is not invalidated
as evidence of value merely because it reflects the value of the
power to control distribution. And here there is no evidence of
circumstances surrounding the sale, such as fraud, duress, mis-
take, etc., which if present would destroy or impair the probative
effect of price received as evidence of value. That being so, the
evidence of an actual price, determined by the process of
arm's-length negotiations as to the value of a control block be-
tween informed parties -the principal seller having long been the
active, responsible, executive of the business and the buyers being
a group which had made a painstaking investigation of all phases
of the business and had had the benefit of expert advice of its own
choosing-is by far the most convincing evidence as to value in
the record. Certainly its reliability far exceeds the opinion testi-
mony of any of the experts, or price quotations for small lots. The
defendants are thus entitled to a dismissal because a great pre-
ponderance of the evidence shows that each received no more
than a pro rata share of the fair value of the block sold.
"The simple holding just indicated is decisive of the case, as
will be apparent when one examines its impact on every position
taken by the plaintiff."
8' 3
Notice of appeal was filed on January 7, 1953. Emily Reumert
did not join the appeal from the judgment. In an opinion dated
September 24, 1953, Chief Judge Hincks resolved various dis-
putes concerning bills of costs and objections filed by various
parties.8 4 On December 11, 1953, after payment of a $12,500 fee
82 Id. at 184-85.
93 Id. at 185.
84 Perlman v. Feldmann, 116 F. Supp. 102 (D. Conn. 1953). See, e.g., id. at 113-114:
The plaintiffs claim that all costs to Newport incurred as incidental to
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to plaintiffs' counsel by Wilport, 85 the United States District
Court in Delaware dismissed with prejudice Civil Action No.
1390-Birnbaum, et al. v. Wilport Company and Newport Steel
Corp.86-a stockholders' suit seeking an injunction against the
sale of steel to the the Wilport group, a declaration that the new
management was improperly in office, an accounting, and dam-
ages.8
7
active participation in the defense should be dissolved. Newport is the
corporate beneficiary which failed and refused to bring the action in its own
name. Since it thus declined to assume the role of a plaintiff the plaintiff
brought the action allegedly in its behalf naming Newport as a defendant.
Concededly, it was a necessary party. But plaintiffs claim that its position as
a defendant was nominal only in that it stood to gain by the litigation without
hazard of loss. On that account their contention is that it is not entitled to
such costs as were incurred because of its active and voluntary participation
in the defense,
This contention is overruled. The bringing of the action required Newport,
acting of course through its board of directors, to decide whether actively to
participate in the defense or not. This required an honest determination of
whether the corporate interest required its participation, It may well have
decided that the plaintiffs' claim was unfounded and that no recovery was
reasonably to be expected for its benefit. Indeed, its prior failure and refusal
to sue imports that such was its judgment. That left for decision the question
whether the prosecution of the action, even though it should eventually prove
unsuccessful, might be harmful to the corporation, if the prosecution were
left to proceed without constant and active representation in behalf of the
corporation. That Newport answered this question in the affirmative, is to be
interred from the fact that it did participate.
I do not understand the plaintiffs to dispute that these questions were
within the scope of managerial authority vested in a board of directors: the
gist of their contention is, rather, that the power was not wisely or honestly
exercised. However, the plaintiffs at no time, at trial or before, sought to
challenge Newport's right to defend. On the contrary, in their pre-trial
discovery proceedings plaintiffs on several occasions took advantage of New-
port's presence as an adversary party. But this aside, if a challenge to the
right were now directly before me for decision, and had been timely present-
ed, I would rule that there is no showing in the record of the case of fraud or
other exceptional factors which would justify a court in countermanding the
decisions made by the corporate management. See Fletcher on Corporations,
Vol. 5, Sec. 2104. I note that by Par. I I of the complaint it was charged that
the new board of directors, which made the decision to participate in the
defense, caused the "corporation to embark on a policy" which "will deprive
it of substantial profits and customer good will." I cannot accept plaintiffs
contention that this was only an attack on the present directors in their
individual capacities. The allegation was one relating to a corporate policy
which the directors might think harmful to the corporation if allowed to stand
without refutation or explanation. I note also that the plaintiffs' position
throughout was such that they sought to disparage the value of the corporate
assets. This effort if unopposed might reasonably have been considered
harmful to the corporate credit. And, I think it fair to say, in all its pretrial
phases the issues of the case were in such a highly fluid state, notwithstand-
ing my efforts to limit and define them, that the directors might have thought
corporate participation in the trial was necessary to resist or explain unfore-
seen efforts by the plaintiffs to establish facts having an impact harmful to
proper corporate interests.
Of course, I cannot know just what motives or what particular consid-
erations led the corporation to make its decision. In this connection it may be
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The Court of Appeals panel selected to hear Perlman v. Feld-
mann-which was argued on October 5 and 6, 1954-consisted of
Learned Hand, Jerome N. Frank, and Chief Judge Charles E.
Clark. As was the custom on the Second Circuit, 89 memorandums
were prepared and circulated after the argument.
In their memorandums dated October 12,90 13,91 and 15,92
1954, all three judges voted to reverse the District Court's deci-
sion on the basis that Feldmann had transferred a corporate asset
to Wilport by means of transfer of the stock. Under date of
December 27, 1954, a letter was sent to counsel in the case
informing them that Judge Hand "had determined that he should
hold himself disqualified"-Judge Hand's son-in-law was a mem-
ber of a law firm serving as attorneys for defendants-and re-
questing their consent to his replacement on the panel by Judge
worth noting that by the suit no recovery was sought of the directors who
made the decision. In view of my own considered decision on the merits I
cannot criticize the Board for its conclusion that the action would not result
in a recovery for the corporate benefit. And on the whole, even if timely
challenge had been made to the corporate right to participate, I could not
properly have denied that right. For, even if the need for corporate participa-
tion does not affirmatively appear, nothing has been shown which would
warrant me in substituting my judgment for that of the Board as to the
existence of that need.
If, as I thus hold, Newport had a right to participate, it must follow that on
entry of a decree for the defendants, Newport is entitled to taxable costs
incurred incidental to the exercise of that right.
8See Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11, Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir. 1955).
86 (Civ. Action No. 1390 (D. Del. 1953).
87 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 2, at 38.
88 Much of the Second Circuit material in this section is based on the Charles E. Clark
papers for access to which I wish to thank the Library of the Yale Law School.
89 M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 96 (1970):
In the large number of cases not disposed of summarily, the judges of the
Second Circuit follow a practice "hallowed by tradition" and "believed to be
unique" among American appellate courts. The judges do not confer until
about a week or so (usually the Wednesday or Thursday) after argument. In
the interim, each judge working independently prepares a memo-
randum-actually a tentative opinion-on every case not yet decided, in
which he gives his views and vote. It is understood that what is said in a
memorandum does not preclude changes of mind later [footnotes omitted].
90 Learned Hand memorandum at 2, 3:
The question does, however, remain whether the plaintiffs have shown that
Feldmann took to himself some benefis that might have come to Newport. In
several earlier instances Newport had availed itself of the "Feldmann Plan."
by which Newport borrowed from its customers without paying any interest
upon the loan. That was really one form of "gray marketing" and was
"unethical" (horrid illiterate word) so far as any breaking of the published
prices was "unethical." Newport had in fact found it profitable to give a
commitment in the very recent past; and it was a fair inference that it could
have exacted a similar profit on this occasion, and would have done so, since
no scruples would have intervened.
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Thomas W. Swan (retired). 93 Consent from all counsel having
been received by the end of the month, the Clerk was directed on
December 31, 1954, to transmit the appendices and briefs to
Judge Swan, and the latter, in a memorandum dated January 4,
1955, adumbrated the dissent he was later to publish. Finally,
both the Frank 94 and Hand 95 memorandums suggested barring
Wilport Stock (at the time held by Merritt-Chapman & Scott) 96
from sharing in the recovery, a holding contained in the opinion
Clark wrote for the panel.
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was dated January 26, 1955. On February 9,
1955, Newport Steel Corporation filed a Petition for Rehearing
raising the following issue:
Hincks, J., seemed to question whether, since the transaction was "une-
thical," the court would hold its nose and compel Feldmann to disgorge. I
suppose he was thinking of the bill for an accouting by one highwayman
against another that Popham, J., entertained; but on this occasion it was the
other shareholders that Feldmann deprived of a benefit, and they were not
personally implicated. Besides, the fault, if it was one, was not of a kind that
stank so much in the nose of the court that the fiduciary could keep his swag.
Besides, we don't have to rely upon the benefit in cash that Newport might
have exacted in consideration of giving Wilport an indefinite call on its
product. That was a right of some value anyway: i.e., the assurance of an
option, a call, without any engagement by Wilport to take any part, if the
steel market should become a buyer's market. Surely it would have been
unlawful for Newport to give such a call without consideration. Yet by the
sale of his shares, Feldmann did commit Newport to just that; for as the
controlling shareholder Wilport obtained power to take as much steel as it
needed, when it needed it, and not to take anything if the demand should
slacken.
91 Jerome N. Frank memorandum at I:
Judge Hincks held that the "power" to control the "distribution" of the
company's product-which power was acquired by Wilport (buyer of Feld-
mann's shares)-did not constitute "an asset of the corporation" (i.e., New-
port). For that reason, Hincks said he was not finding what part of the $20 a
share was paid for the acquisition of that power.
But I think this power was a corporate asset. I think the evidence
sufficiently shows that, in the period of steel shortage, this power could have
yielded financial gain to the corporation. (It might not have been obtained by
the company directly in cash, but indirectly through a "Feldmann Plan" or
otherwise).
With that fact sufficiently established, Feldmann had the burden of show-
ing what part of the price (if any) represented Feldmann's sale of that power,
since', by his conduct, he made the proof difficult. Package Closure Corp. v.
Sealright Co.. 141 F. (2d) 972, 979 (C.A.2); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
327 U.S. 251, 265-266; Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555,
565-566.
If Feldmann did gain through the sale of that power, he is in no position to
argue that it would have been unethical for the company to sell it for gain.
Feldmann is a shrewd businessman, as the record shows. It is therefore
unbelievable that he was not aware that the shares' buyers intended to use
that power for their selfish benefit without paying the company therefor. If he
did receive some cash for the sale of the power, he must have been aware of
that fact, i.e., that he was deriving some gain from the sale of a corporate
asset.
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It is the contention of the petitioner that the court erred in
ordering the aforesaid profits to be paid directly to stock-
holders and a rehearing on this sole issue is requested.9 7
After citing and quoting from a number of decisions from
various jurisdictions, the petition concluded its argument in the
following terms:
This learned Court has cited the cases of Seagrave Corp.
v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954) and Southern Pacific
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1918) as the basis for its
awarding damages in a stockholders' derivative suit propor-
tionally to the stockholders of the corporation. Petitioner
desires to call to the attention of the court that the Southern
Pacific case was not a stockholders' derivative action. Mr.
Justice Brandeis who delivered the opinion of the Court
stated at page 487 as follows:
In considering the many objections urged
against the decree, it is important to bear con-
stantly in mind the exact nature of the equity in-
voked by the bill and recognized by the lower
92 Charles E. Clark memorandum at 1, 2:
Feldmann's liability turns on whether the sale of his stock is viewed as
merely a personal transaction or as including an asset of the corporation, for
which Feldmann had to account to it. Judge Hincks held that the power to
derive economic benefits from a favorable market by advantageous choice of
customers was not a corporate asset because it was not reflected on the
business sheets of the corporation. This seems an unduly restrictive meaning
of corporate property in the light of Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, in
which an appeal from confirmation of a reorganization plan was considered
an asset for which fiduciaries had to account. And Judge Hincks elsewhere
relied on a broader concept of corporate property when he assessed defend-
ant's stock on the basis of prospective corporate earnings, a standard more
intimately related to the market than to balance sheet calculations. Perhaps it
is a bit wooden or overreification to call all this a bit of "corporate property"
I incline to plaintiffs' expression-as semantically neater (sic)-of corporate
fiduciary power in trust.
93 Thomas W. Swan retired on July I, 1953.
94 Jerome N. Frank memorandum at 2:
The decree could be that he account to the corporation. But I think there
is justification for a decree that he pay directly to the holders of the stock not
sold to Wilport their proportionate share (about 70%) of the amount of his
improper gain.
95 Learned Hand memorandum at 4:
[T]he value of [Finding 120] for Feldmann's purpose disappears because
of the last sentence: 'What value the block would have had, if shorn of the
appurtenant power to control distribution of the corporate product, the evi-
dence does not show.' That is exactly the issue that Feldmann had to prove,
and in so far as he fails he must repay to the corporation the price he got,
though Wilport cannot keep its share of that recovery.
96 See part A (iv) supra.
97 Petition for Rehearing at 2, Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). Cf.
note 83 supra.
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courts. The minority stockholders do not complain
of a wrong done the corporation or of any wrong
done by it to them. They complain of the wrong
done them directly by the Southern Pacific, and by
it alone....
The Seagrave case concerned itself only with the enjoining of
certain defendants from consummating a certain purchase of
stock. This case involved no monetary award whatsoever.
This Court in its opinion on page 436 thereof states that
"Defendants cannot well object to this form of recovery ......
Petitioner, Newport Steel Corporation, however, a defendant
in the action, very definitely objects to being deprived of the
recovery of damages sustained by it. Petitioner believes that
the effect of the Court's decision is the declaration of a
dividend without regard to the financial condition of the cor-
poration, the rights of creditors or its tax situation. In so
doing, the Court is usurping the functions of management
contrary to its own established law and practice. This Court
has recognized that recovery in stockholders' derivative ac-
tions belongs to the corporation. See Green v. Victor Talking
Mach. Co., 28 F.2d 378 (2nd Cir. 1928).98
In a memorandum dated February 15, 1955, Judge Clark noted
about the petition that:
This seems to me a properly shrewd move, which I com-
mend on that level; since the lush situation is now deteriorat-
ing judicialwise, Newport wants to get back for its crowd of
insiders the money paid Feldmann to get its preferred posi-
tion. But the reasons we gave against this before still stand.
Newport's argument seems confined to the semantic level:
"since this is a stockholder's derivative suit, ergo." Omit the
premise as we should, since it was the other stockholders
who were primarily injured, and there is nothing left. Prac-
tically our result is the only one which has meaning in any
attempt to hold these trade buccaneers to a modicum of
morality. 99
Since Judge Swan, in a memorandum dated February 10, 1955,
had already noted that "As I disagreed with the opinion on this
point (last paragraph of my dissent) I naturally think the petition
should be granted. But if my brothers deny it I shall make no
squawk but prefer not to sign the order,"' 10 0 and since Judge
98 Petition for Rehearing at 8. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
99 Charles E. Clark memorandum at I.
100 Thomas W. Swan memorandum at I.
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Frank noted that "I agree with Charlie's memo of Feb. 15,
1955",101 a Per Curiam order, signed only by Judges Clark and
Frank, denying the petition for rehearing, was filed on February
28, 1955.
On April 22, 1955, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court of
the United States, seeking certiorari on the basis that:
Shares of stock are a common article of trade and sales of
control blocks of outstanding shares in both small and large
companies are an every day occurrence, and every day shares
are sold in the open market at prices far above or far below
book value.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is a drastic departure
from the existing law regarding stock ownership, and is con-
trary to every other court decision on this important question.
This novel decision is of all-pervading importance as it affects
the rights of every stockholder of every corporation, whether
large or small.
Although theoretically the decision below can be said to
represent only the view of the Second Circuit, it will be read
by lawyers and businessmen throughout the country as an
expression of general law. This is particularly true because
the decision below purports to apply what it regards as the
universal requirements of equity and cites as its authorities
cases in this Court and the courts of states other than In-
diana.
If the decision of the Court of Appeals is permitted to
stand, it will not only create a federal rule at variance with the
corporate laws of the several states but it will invite endless
stockholders' litigation because of the impossible burden of
proof which is imposed upon the sellers. No one selling a
control block of shares could ever know to whom he may sell
or at what price, because he cannot know what value a court
will subsequently find after the shares are hypothetically
shom of one or another attribute of control necessarily trans-
ferred with the voting rights inherent in the shares.
10 2
The Brief in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari, filed on May
23, 1955, by the firms of Pomerantz Levy & Haudek, as General
101 Jerome N. Frank memorandum at 1 (February 21, 1955).
102 Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 27-28, Feldmann v. Perlman, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
[VOL. 8:1
Perlman v. Feldmann
Counsel for Respondents, and Proskauer Rose Goetz & Men-
delsohn, as Appellate Counsel for Respondents,10 3 concluded its
arguments by pointing out that:
The decision below was interlocutory. Certiorari "is and
generally should be issued only after a final decree"; Panama
R. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U.S. 280, 284 (1897).
Review of interlocutory decisions is allowed only where
"necessary to prevent extraordinary inconvenience and em-
barrassment in the conduct of the cause"; American Con-
struction Co. v. Jacksonville T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U.S.
372, 384. No such extraordinary circumstances have been
shown. On the contrary, if petitioners, as they now contend,
can demonstrate upon the accounting that the price they
received was no more than the fair value of their stock, there
will be no liability and the legal issues will be academic. The
application for certiorari is therefore premature.
Nor does the case involve any of the broad questions
which petitioners would seek to present to this Court. The
decision below rests, not on the sweeping generalities which
petitioners would impute to the Court of Appeals, but on the
application of familiar principles of fiduciary law to the par-
ticular facts of this case.
10 4
A Reply Brief having been filed by Petitioners on May 31,
1955, certiorari was denied on June 6, 1955,105 and the case
therefore remanded to the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut. District Judge Robert P. Anderson, 10 6 in
an opinion dated July 18, 1957, defined the task he had just
completed in the following terms:
The problem has been to find the fair market value of the
Newport Steel Corporation as a going concern, i.e. its enter-
prise value, on August 31, 1950. For the purpose of eval-
uating the control block shorn of the power to control the
103 On Briefs filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Pomerantz Levy & Haudek are listed as General Counsel for all Plaintiffs and Attorneys
for Plaintiff-Appellant, Jane Perlman; Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn are listed as
Appellate Counsel for all Appellants and Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Arthur
Kramer, Inger Lawrence, Muriel Lawrence, A. Charles Lawrence, Edith Lawrence, James
J. Lawrence, and Isaac Wagner; and Nemerov & Shapiro and William Rosenfeld as
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, Harry Mernoff. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F.
Supp. 162, 163 (D. Conn., 1952) lists attorneys for plaintiffs as follows:
Pomerantz, Levy, Schreiber & Haudak, New York City, Saltman Weiss &
Connors, Bridgeport, Conn., Sidney L. Garvin, Abraham S. UlIman, New
Haven, Conn., Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn. New York City,
Marsh Day & Calhoun, Bridgeport, Conn., Nemerov & Shapiro, William
Rosenfeld, New York City.
104 Brief for Respondents at 28, Feldmann v. Perlman, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
105 Feldmann v. Perlman, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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corporation's output of steel, the court has accepted the
mathematical sequel of dividing the enterprise value of the
corporation by the number of shares outstanding and mul-
tiplying the result by the number of shares in the block. What
special value there may have been to an investor in being
able to manage the corporation without controlling or having
any particular interest in using the product or channeling its
distribution to end users in which he was interested, is impli-
cit in the factors going to determine enterprise value. In this
case it is found that the difference between the value of the
block thus arrived at, and the amount paid the individual
defendants by the Wilport Company constituted a bonus or
premium paid the individual defendants by the Wilport Com-
pany to control the corporation's output of steel.
The conclusion as to enterprise value of the Newport Steel
Corporation on August 31, 1950, was arrived at by the ex-
perts for the plaintiffs and the experts for the defendants by
somewhat different means. Each tended to emphasize factors
which were helpful to the side for which he was testifying.
The plaintiffs' expert gave great weight to records of earnings
for several years prior to August 3 1, 1950 and little weight to
changes in means and equipment for production and sales in
the few months preceding August, 1950, the changes in de-
mand for products and the reasonably foreseeable con-
sequences of these changes in the period following August
3 1, 1950. The defendants' expert, on the other hand, relied
heavily on a projection into the future of the higher earnings
achieved in the recent past plus increased or normalized
earnings by the new steel facilities, insufficiently tempered by
the negative consideration of increased taxes.
The court has been greatly assisted by observing the tools
used by the experts and their procedures in using them; but it
has adopted the final conclusion of neither.10 7
,He concluded that:
After considering all of the evidence relative to the various
divisions of the Newport Steel Corporation the court has
adopted what it has conceived to be the methods best adapted
to disclose the fair market value of each of the divisions as
part of the going concern. The total of the values of each of
these divisions has been found to be $ 15,825,777.53, which is
the enterprise value of Newport Steel Corporation. Each
106 Judge Carroll C. Hincks was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit on December 7, 1953.
107 Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436. 447-48 (D. Conn. 1957).
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share therefore had a fair market value on August 31, 1950,
of $14.67 and the premium or bonus per share was $5.33.108
In an opinion dated March 5, 1958, Judge Anderson found
"that a reasonable and proper allowance, under the circumstances
of this case, for attorneys' fees for the attorneys appearing for the
plaintiffs and those whom they represent is $450,000. There is
also allowed, in addition, the reasonable expenses incurred by
counsel in the total sum of $38,329.73"109
Of these amounts, Pomerantz, Levy & Haudek and Associates
received $274,000 in fees and $30,714.61 in expenses; Proskauer,
Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn and Associates received $173,000 in
fees and $6,829.12 in expenses; Sidney L. Garwin and Associates
received $1,800 in fees and $486.00 in expenses; and Nemerov &
Shapiro and Associates received $1,200 in fees and $300.00 in
expenses.110
Judge Anderson further held that "[aifter payment of the above
listed fees and expenses, the remainder of the amount recovered
by the plaintiffs in the settlement of the case ($1,150,000) will be
divided among and distributed to the plaintiffs and those whom
they represent in proportion to the shares held by each, whether
such shares are represented by certificates of stock or
non-negotiable receipts of Newcorp, Inc. The words 'those whom
they represent' are construed to mean and are found to be the
holders of shares (exclusive of the Wilport shares)"1 of Newcorp,
Inc., either in certificates of stock or non-negotiable receipts, as
listed on the books of the Company as of the close of business on
September 30, 1957."112
(v)
In an article entitled "Abe Pomerantz Is Watching You,"
Fortune magazine delineated a jurisprudential basis for proceed-
108 Id. at 451. 1
109 Perlman v. Feldmann, 160 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1958).
11O Id. at 311. Compare note 103 supra, with note 113 and accompanying text infra.
"I See note 96 and accompanying text supra. Cf. a story entitled "Wolfson, Gerbert
Retrial Ends in Deadlocked Jury" in the Wall Street Journal of May 9,1972, at 2, col. 3:
A mistrial was declared when a federal jury failed after three days to agree
on a verdict on charges of perjury and securities law violations against
Florida finaniers Louis Wolfson and Elkin B. Gerbert....
The charges against Mr. Wolfson, of Miami Beach, and Mr. Gerbert, of
Jacksonville, involved a connection with Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., of
which Mr. Wolfson was board chairman. Merritt-Chapman, a construction
company that became a conglomerate, went into liquidation last year.
112 Perlman v. Feldmann, 160 F. Supp. 310, 311 (D. Conn. 1958).
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ings such as those to a history of which part B of this article has
been devoted:
In the first twenty or thirty years of this century, most
stockholder suits were instigated by lawyers whose principal
aim was to be bought off, and actions of this kind became
known as strike suits....
No one would guess from the style in which Pomerantz
lives and works that in an average year he makes well over
$350,000, a figure that only ten or twelve other lawyers in the
U.S. can match....
Pomerantz' dislike for conspicous consumption is no doubt
associated with the fact that for more than forty years he has
been a socialist....
In Pomerantz' lifetime, the social status of the stockholder
lawyer has improved. Even many corporation lawyers now
believe that some of the full-disclosure provisions of the
post-1929 securities laws can be more efficiently policed by
lawyers like Pomerantz than by the government....
As a device for keeping corporate officers honest, however,
the stockholder suit has a serious flaw. In a 1964 opinion
Judge Henry J. Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals point-
ed out, "The plaintiff stockholders or, more realistically, their
attorneys have every incentive to accept a settlement that
runs into high six figures or more, regardless of how strong
the claims for much larger amounts may be .... A juicy bird
in the hand is worth more than the vision of a much larger
one in the bush." ...
This puts a heavy burden on the conscience of the
plaintiff's lawyer. Pomerantz points out, "There's no
flesh-and-blood client you have to look in the eye while
you're explaining why you want to settle for a tenth of what
you are suing for. In a suit where you're representing 40,000
stockholders, there's always the temptation to tell yourself,
'Well, I'm getting them something; why knock myself out?' In
the end it's a matter of plain conscience." Pomerantz finds
this depressing, since he believes that conscience is a weak
reed to lean on in business affairs. "My professional exper-
ience has taught me that fiduciary duty usually succumbs to
that old devil self-interest or acquisitiveness."1 13
C. The Precedent
(i)
As a lawyer who practiced corporate law in the middle 1960's,
113 Klaw,,Abe Pomerantz Is Watching You, 77 FORTUNE 144, 146, 161 (Feb., 1968).
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I can testify that at least some of the corporate bar viewed
Perlman v. Feldmann as "a drastic departure from the existing
law regarding stock ownership . . . [creating] a federal rule at
variance with the corporate laws of the several states." 114 The
scholarly work that stated the feared change most precisely was
an article entitled "The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportun-
ity in the Sale of Shares" by William D. Andrews, 1 5 which
proposed the rule that ". . .. whenever a controlling stockholder
sells his shares, every other holder of shares (of the same class) is
entitled to have an equal opportunity to sell his shares, or a
prorata part of them, on substantially the same terms."
' 116
That rule has not become the law in the years since Perlman v.
Feldmann. One explanation for this state of affairs is that "It
should . . .be apparent that there is no logical relation between
the rule of equal opportunity and the problems of looting and
corporate squeezes with which it seems mainly designed to deal,
[which] problems . . .do not require any transfer of control."
1 17
An academic analysis is phrased in economic terms:
In effect then, the rule of equal treatment would impose
higher capital requirements on beneficial purchasers in a sub-
stantial number of transactions. Professor Andrews in-
appropriately assumes, however, that the purchasers should
be willing to meet these higher costs because the investment
value of the additional shares is the same. He errs in that his
reasoning is incomplete. It is true that the investment value is
the same. But even if the capital market did function perfectly
and the purchaser could arrange the financing, a rational
businessman might not want to buy all the shares at a pre-
mium price justified by the investment potential. It might be
sensible to decline to buy more than the bare amount neces-
sary for control on the principles of diversification of risk and
of opportunity. This might render the equal treatment rule
ineffectual as a means of automatically distinguishing "good"
and "bad" purchasers. I would think that the number of
prospective beneficial purchasers prevented because of a de-
sire to diversify will be much larger than those simply unable
to raise the capital. Until empirical evidence is adduced to the
contrary, I am predisposed to consider this cost of restraining
114 See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
115 Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965).
116 Id. at 515.
117 Letts, Sales of Control Stock and the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 26 Bus.
LAW. 631, 646 (1971).
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beneficial transactions substantial when compared with the
cases of detriment with which the present law is incompetent
to deal....
Aside from the elegance of the ideal, which I leave to
commentators on reapportionment, it seems that "equality"
can only be justified if it somehow improves the functioning
of the securities market. Admittedly it might restrain detri-
mental transactions, but at great cost. It might on the other
hand be contended that equality would so improve the psy-
chology and faith of investors, as the securities acts are al-
leged to do, that all present shareholders would be benefited
by the influx of new shareholders. But it is proper to note in
closing that in corporation law it is the maximization of
profits that is the overriding principle, and unlike the political
arena, equality is not justified for its own sake. 118
It was precisely the political theme of "equality," how-
ever-the extent to which the mechanisms of the voting franchise
granted to the corporate shareholder are subject to the ideological
pressures of democracy in United States society -that produced a
recent decision-Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC'1 9
-demonstrating, when its rationale is appraised in conjunction
with that of Perlman v. Feldmann, many of the ways in which
legal control of the corporation in American society is different
today from what it was ten or twenty years ago.
(ii)
Since the purpose of this Section is to assess the precedential
significance of Perlman v. Feldmann - the meaning of that deci-
sion today-it seems appropriate, before exploring the broader
question of the changes in the meaning of corporate law produced
by the passage of time, to question whether the type of attack
made on the transaction with which we are concerned in the case
of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. continues to be subject to
"the inadequacies of state court jurisdiction"; whether, in other
words, "the broadly remedial purpose of Congress to grant pro-
tection to the public and investors against all types of fraud [in
§10(b) and Rule X-101B-5] is limited in accordance with [that]
decision."1
2 0
11 8 Javares, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor
Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 420, 426, 428 (1965).
119432 F. 2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
120 See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
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The present status of the Birnbaum decision was perhaps most
succinctly put by a District Judge in the very Circuit in which it
was rendered, who recently held that "although some courts have
held that a private party not a purchaser or seller, seeking in-
junctive relief, may have standing to assert a § 10(b) violation...
and another has suggested the elimination of the purchaser-seller
requirement ... it is still the rule in this Circuit that the require-
ment be satisfied in a suit for damages. "
121
Another procedural ruling related to Perlman v. Feldmann
which may well not be the law today is the opinion byHon. C. C.
Hincks in Mernoff v. Ballantyne.122 In an opinion dated January
13, 1972, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania held as follows:
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is designed to put an
end to interstate frauds in the sale and trading of securities. It
would be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish this pur-
pose if, when a complex scheme is alleged involving defend-
ants from many states, venue for a particular district would
have to be established as to each alleged participant in the
illegal plan by proving that his illegal acts in furtherance of
the fraud were committed in that district. An unnecessary
multiplicity of suits and fragmenting of the issues involved
would be the result of such a venue requirement. I follow the
lead of many other courts in reading 15 U.S.C § 78aa as
providing that venue is proper as to all defendants in any
district where it is alleged that any one defendant has com-
mitted acts that are violative of the act and in furtherance of
the alleged illegal scheme [citations omitted]. 123
Both Mernoff and Birnbaum were, however, the law when
Perlman v. Feldmann was decided; 124 the question, moreover, is
what Perlman v. Feldmann, not Birnbaum, means today.
121 Ingenito v. Bermec Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 1154, 1185 (S.D.N.Y., 1974) (cita-
tions omitted).
122 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
123 In Re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 338 F. Supp. 438, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
124 Cf. Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Ind., 461 F.2d 525, 528-30 (7th Cir.
1972) (footnotes omitted):
The district court had dismissed the Bankers Life case primarily upon the
authority of the Birnbaum case .... In other words, Birnbaum, in interpreting
the words "in connection," required a fairly direct nexus between the alleged
fraud and the purchase or sale of a security.
The district court in Bankers Life held that the superintendent of insurance
as liquidator of Manhattan had standing to maintain an action regarding the
sale of Manhattan's portfolio of United States bonds. But the fraud, although
"a complicated scheme of common law fraud" and "a scheme to loot a
corporation of its assets," was not a "federal fraud" because of its lack of
effect on the public interest in maintaining free and open securities markets.
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(iii)
The erosion of the Birnbaum rationale represents, it should be
noted, not simply a replacement of state by federal law in terms of
the source to which a court looks for the standards to be applied
to the transaction before it, but also an attempt to provide for the
regulation of transactions which had formerly escaped regulation
because of "the inadequacies of state court jurisdiction.- 1 25 Since
the standard to be applied is Rule X-10B-5 and the agency ulti-
mately charged with its application is a federal district court, the
demise of Birnbaum represents a determination to permit share-
holders, utilizing standards promulgated by a federal adminis-
trative agency, to resort to federal courts for protection against
certain types of transactions.
Ten or twenty years ago, however, attempts to regulate corpo-
rate transactions and to protect corporate shareholders were fo-
cused on pursuit of that general goal called "shareholder democra-
cy." The champions of these campaigns were such as Wilma Soss
and John J. and Lewis Gilbert; the arenas in which they were
waged were shareholders' meetings rather than federal courts; and
the federal statutory provision most often at issue was § 14(a) 126
In affirming, the court of appeals held that the fraud alleged "in no way
affected either the securities market or the investing public. No stockholders
were defrauded, no investor injured. The purity of the security transaction
and the purity of the trading process were unsullied." 430 F.2d at 361. The
court also quoted Birnbaum in stating, "Rule lOb-5 was not intended to
provide a remedy for schemes amounting to no more than 'fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs.' " 430 F.2d at 360.
In reversing the lower courts, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
unanimous Supreme Court, held that a cause of action respecting the sale by
Manhattan of its Treasury bonds had been charged under section 10(b)....
In the present case the complaint alleged that MCI suffered an injury as a
result of deceptive practices touching its purchase of securities when it
received only 25 percent of the Mi-Com stock for its valuable assets. There
is also the claim that MCI issued its own shares to controlling shareholders
for less than adequate consideration Ruckel v. Roto American Corp., 339
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert denied, Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906, 89 S. Ct. 1747, 23
L. Ed. 2d 219 (1969).
Neither counsel for the plaintiffs in struggling to state a federal claim nor
the district court in failing to find a federal claim could anticipate that the
Supreme Court would effect a change in the Birnbaum principles.
But that decision compels us to reverse the district court judgment for the
reason that under Bankers Life the second amended complaint stated a
federal claim.
125 See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
126 Sec. 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n, provides for the
regulation of proxies and the information contained therein. Rule 14(a)-8(S), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(c) (1970), specfically relates to "Proposals of Security Holders," and contains
the following relevant provisions:
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rather than § 10(b). The extent to which this goal of "shareholder
democracy" has served as the justification for regulation of the
activities of corporate management by federal courts and by the
Securities and Exchange Commission is illustrated by the pro-
ceedings in SEC v. Transamerica Corp.12 7
In a letter dated January 2, 1946, John J. Gilbert, holder of
seventeen shares of Transamerica Corporation, informed manage-
ment of four proposals which he wished presented for action at
the annual stockholders' meeting to be held April 25, 1946, one of
which involved the repeal of By-Law 47 and its replacement by
one not containing the requirement that notice of any proposed
alteration or amendment of the By-Laws be contained in the
notice of meeting. By-Law 8 required management to call a spe-
cial meeting upon receiving a request in writing from holders of a
majority of the stock in the corporation, and amendment of a
By-Law could be the purpose for which stockholders requested
such a meeting; By-Law 47-in the absence of such a
request-was interpreted by management as conferring upon it
discretion to omit notice of a By-Law amendment desired by a
stockholder from the notice of the annual meeting. Notice of the
meeting, proxy statements, and proxies for the annual meeting
scheduled for April 25, 1946, were mailed to stockholders begin-
ning March 18, 1946. The proxy material contained a statement
that a stockholder had indicated his intention to present certain
proposals for action at the meeting, but that such proposals would
be ruled out of order if presented because they were not men-
tioned in the notice of the meeting.
In the District Court, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(which had notified management on March 29, 1946, that its
failure to comply with Gilbert's requests was a violation of proxy
rules) argued that John J. Gilbert's attempts to bring proposals to
the attention of the shareholders at the annual meeting "cannot be
circumscribed by arbitrary procedural obstacles created by man-
agement, for the requirement that a notice of a proposed amend-
[Mianagement may omit a proposal... from its proxy statement and form of
proxy under any of the following circumstances:
(2) If the proposal:
(ii) Consists of a recommendation, request, or mandate that action be
taken with respect to any matter, including a general economic, political,
racial, religious, social, or similar cause, that is not significantly related to the
business of the issuer or is not within the control of the issuer...
127 The material in the following paragraph is based on SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67
F. Supp, 326, 327-328, 332 (D. Del. 1946).
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ment should be contained in the notice of the annual meeting -as
a condition precedent for its consideration at the meeting-was
intended to protect stockholders and not to give management a
device which they can arbitrarily utilize to prevent consideration
or vote on a stockholder's proposal, simply because management
does not choose to mention such proposals in the notice of meet-
ing." 1
28
The District Court rejected this argument on the basis that
"[t]here is nothing in the General Corporation Law of Delaware
or in the charter or by-laws of Transamerica Corporation which
requires it to give stockholders notice of any by-law amendment
which a shareholder desires to submit at an annual meeting. If the
Board of Directors refuses to notice an amendment which a
shareholder deems desirable, he must seek his remedy in other
channels."
129
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed this holding by the District Court: "If this minor provi-
sion may be employed as Transamerica seeks to employ it, it will
serve to circumvent the intent of Congress in enacting the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934. It was the intent of Congress to
require fair opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage.
The control of great corporations by a very few persons was the
abuse at which Congress struck in enacting Section l4(a). We
entertain no doubt that Proxy Rule X-14A-7 represents a proper
exercise of the authority conferred by Congress on the Commis-
sion under Section 14(a). This seems to us to end the matter. The
power conferred upon the Commission by Congress cannot be
frustrated by a corporate by-law."' 30
The proposals Gilbert was attempting to bring to the attention
of the shareholders were a change in the place at which the annual
meeting was held from Wilmington, Delaware, to San Francisco,
California; the election of independent public auditors by the
shareholders; and a requirement that a report of the annual meet-
ing proceedings be sent to all shareholders. The extent to which
perceptions of needed corporate reforms had undergone a drastic
transformation in the years after the Transamerica decision was
demonstrated on March 11, 1968.
On that date Dr. Quentin D. Young of the Medical Committee
128 Id. at 33 1.
129 Id. (footnote omitted).
130 SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 5 11, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert denied, 332 U.S.
847 (1948) (footnote omitted).
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for Human Rights wrote to the Secretary of the Dow Chemical
Company, stating that the Medical Comittee had obtained by gift
several shares of Dow stock and proposing the following wording
to be sent to stockholders:
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of the Dow Chemical
Company request the Board of Directors, in accordance with
the laws of the State of Delaware, and the Composite Certifi-
cate of Incorporation of the Dow Chemical Company, to
adopt a resolution setting forth an amendment to the Com-
posite Certificate of Incorporation of the Dow Chemical
Company that napalm shall not be sold to any buyer unless
that buyer gives reasonable assurance that the substance will
not be used on or against human beings.
In a letter dated March 21, 1968, the General Counsel of Dow
Chemical informed the Medical Committee that the proposal had
arrived too late for inclusion in the 1968 proxy statement 31
When the Committee renewed its request the following year,
haying modified the last section of its proposal to provide that
"the company shall not make napalm," Dow Chemical responded
that it intended to omit the proposal from the 1969 statement
under the authority of subsections of SEC Rule 14a-8. "The
Committee requested that Dow's decision be reviewed by the
staff of the SEC. On February 18, 1969, the Chief Counsel for the
Division of Corporation Finance wrote both Dow and the Com-
mittee to inform them that 'this Division will not recommend any
action to the Commission if this proposal is omitted from the
management's proxy material.'. . . The SEC Commissioners
granted a request by the Committee that they review the Divi-
sion's decision and affirmed it . .. The Committee then sought
and obtained review of the Commission's decision in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
[which] on July 8, 1970 . . . held . . . that the validity of the
Commission's determination was extremely dubious ... and that
the case should be remanded to the Commission for reconsidera-
tion."13 2
That the Court of Appeals justified its action on an ideological
basis closely akin to that which underlay the Transamerica deci-
sion is clear from the concluding passages of its opinion:
131 The material in this paragraph is based on Medical Comm. for Human Rights v.
SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
132 SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 404-05 (1972).
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No reason has been advanced in the present proceedings
which leads to the conclusion that management may properly
place obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to
present to their co-owners, in accord with applicable state
law, the question of whether they wish to have their assets
used in a manner which they believe to be more socially
responsible but possibly less profitable than that which is
dictated by present company policy....
• . . The management of Dow Chemical Company is re-
peatedly quoted in sources which include the company's own
publications as proclaiming that the decision to continue man-
ufacturing and marketing napalm was made not because of
business considerations, but in spite of them; that manage-
ment in essence decided to pursue a course of activity which
generated little profit for the shareholders and actively im-
paired the company's public relations and the recruitment ac-
tivities because management considered this action morally
and politically desirable .... The proper political and social
role of modern corporations is, of course, a matter of philoso-
phical argument extending far beyond the scope of our
present concern; the substantive wisdom or propriety of par-
ticular corporate political decisions is also completely irrele-
vant to the resolution of the present controversy. What is of
immediate concern, however, is the question of whether the
corporate proxy rules can be employed as a shield to isolate
such managerial decisions from shareholder control. After all,
it must be remembered that "[tIhe control of great corpo-
rations by a very few persons was the abuse at which Con-
gress struck in enacting Section 14(a)." SEC v. Transamerica
Corp., supra, 163 F.2d at 518. We think that there is a clear
and compelling distinction between management's legitimate
need for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of
day-to-day business judgment, and management's patently il-
legitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations with
their vast resources as personal satrapies implementing per-
sonal political or moral predilections. It could scarcely be
argued that management is more qualified or more entitled to
make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders who are
the true beneficial owners of the corporation; and it seems
equally implausible that an application of the proxy rules
which permitted such a result could be harmonized with the
philosophy of corporate democracy which Congress embo-
died in section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.133
133 Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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The difference between this case and Transamerica, however,
is that in this instance federal judicial power was utilized to
overturn rather than support the action of the federal adminis-
trative agency.
(iv)
Before exploring the question of the relevance of the Medical
Committee decision to the precedential significance of Perlman v.
Feldmann, it remains to identify the holding in that case: to
attempt to define in reasonably precise terms the factors that
justified the action taken by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in connection with the payments received by Feldmann for stock
that constituted a controlling interest in Newport Steel Corpo-
ration.
The New York Times story quoted in part A (i), supra, de-
scribed the case in the following terms;
Mr. Feldmann sold a controlling block of stock in the
company for $8,000,000 during the Korean War steel short-
age. The stockholders asserted that a portion of his profits
belonged to the corporation and should have been shared by
them.1
34
Furthermore, in the judicial opinion which led to that story,
Judge Anderson pointed out that:
The circumstances leading up to the [Korean War], and
the impact of the war itself created rising prices and a height-
ened demand for steel and other goods. The plaintiffs object
to any emphasis at all on these changed economic conditions,
but the resulting boom and the gray market conditions, point-
ing up the demand for steel, should not be considered as a
factor showing that the defendant received a premium for
their block of stock and at the same time be denied or dis-
regarded in considering enterprise value as of August 3 1,
1950.135
Indeed, the Third Defense in the Answer of Defendant New-
port Steel Corporation to the Consolidated Amended Complaint
in Perlman v. Feldmann was that:
134 See note I and accompanying text supra.
135 Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436, 448 (D. Conn. 1957). See also Connolly,
Perlman v. Feldmann and the Sale of Control-A Brief Reconsideration, 26 Bus. LAW.
1259, 1262 (1971):
Perlman v. Feldmann did not penalize the sale of control per se. Sale of
control to the Wilport syndicate during the Korean war was held unlawful.
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[T]his defendant says that if there is a prevailing scarcity of
steel products with an attendant potential for the advan-
tageous disposition by this defendant of its plant, equipment
or output on a gray or black market, such is not a corporate
asset, as neither this defendant nor any other reputable pro-
ducer or handler of steel should be or is doing anything to
capitalize on, condone or cooperate in such business prac-
tices. Any suggestion that this defendant should sell its prod-
ucts surreptitiously for amounts in excess of its established
mill prices, or upon conditions or requirements that seek to
capitalize on and exploit the current national emergency, is
unpatriotic and in direct contravention of the letter and spirit
of the public policy, declarations and regulations of the Fed-
eral Government, and would involve illegal price dis-
crimination. Any such practice would be flagrantly in-
consistent with the best long-range interests of this defendant
and basically unwise, since it would justifiably undermine its
good will, would augment and contribute to the graveness of
the current national economic emergency, and would be detri-
mental to this defendant, to the steel industry generally, and
to the economy of the country.'
3 6
Viewing Perlman v. Feldmann from an economic as well as
ethical1 3 7 perspective, Professor Andrews noted that:
The premium Feldmann received for his stock was clearly,
in the peculiar circumstances of the case, a form of payment
of a higher price for steel. The court accepted, arguendo,
Feldmann's argument that Newport could not ethically real-
ize on the market situation through higher prices. But it does
not follow that Feldmann, a fiduciary for the corporation by
all views, is then free to appropriate for himself the whole
value of the premium a purchaser is willing to pay; "it ill
becomes the defendants to disparage as unethical the market
advantages from which they themselves reaped rich benefits."
All this suggests that the decision in Feldmann rests on the
peculiarities of a market situation in which users were unable
effectively to reflect their demand by bidding up the price of
steel itself, but were able to reflect the same pressures in a bid
for stock of a steel company.' 3 8
136 Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 10, at 220-2 Ia.
137 Cf. note 90 supra.
138 Andrews, supra note 115 at 514 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Finding of Fact 49, Perlman
v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436, 442 (D. Conn. 1957):
The dominant motive of this purchasing group in seeking to purchase
Feldmann's controlling stock interest in Newport was to obtain a continuing




Insofar as Perlman v. Feldmann represents, therefore, an at-
tempt by the Court of Appeals to re-allocate the premium created
by the market pressures which Andrews described, the fact that
the Court could not justify its holding by reference to Congres-
sional legislation raises the possibility that Perlman v. Feldmann
conflicts with Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 3 9 decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1952, insofar as the
latter case can be read as applying to the judiciary as well as to
the executive.
"In an era generally dominated by insecurity, 1952 was a peak
of frustration and bitterness on the American scene. The Korean
War was entering its third year, 128,000 American casualties had
been spent, and the end seemed nowhere in sight. Truce negotia-
tions at Panmunjom were conducted fruitlessly all year,.in the
midst of ammunition duels and alarming reports of Communist
troop build-ups. Riots in the Communist prisoner of war com-
pounds were a constant irritant. As the war continued to unsettle
the domestic economy- producing an unpopular draft, uneven
wage and price controls, and a mounting inflation-the limit-
ed-war effort came under severe attack. Yet extending the war in
space or weapons was opposed by our Allies, by most of our
military leaders, and by much of the American public as well.
"With our foreign policy tied in this Gordian knot, frustrations
poured into the domestic debates, particularly on the issue of
loyalty and internal security. Set in the context of Senator Joseph
McCarthy's charges that government, colleges, and the commu-
nications media were 'honeycombed with Communists,' 1952 saw
John Carter Vincent dismissed by the State Department as a
loyalty risk, Owen Lattimore indicted for denying to a Senate
Subcommittee that he was 'pro-Communist,' and Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg's conviction (for passing atomic secrets to the Rus-
sians) upheld on appeal. From hundreds of Republican orators
came the charge that Democrats could not be trusted to safeguard
the nation from Communist agents, a challenge which added bit-
ters to the already tart cup of political discourse.
"On the larger political front, 1952 featured a running battle
between the Fair Deal Democratic Administration of President
Harry Truman and a Congress firmly controlled by a Republi-
can-Southern Democratic coalition. More of Truman's domestic
legislative proposals were rejected by Congress in 1952 than in
any previous year of his tenure, with Congressional disaffection
139 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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ranging from Tidelands oil and immigration issues to wages and
price policies and re-organization of executive agencies. Through-
out the legislative session, the Truman Administration was the
subject of steaming investigations into tax frauds, influence peddl-
ing and 'softness toward Communism,' while Republican presi-
dential hopefuls ripped open each Truman proposal to see wheth-
er a campaign issue might be hidden inside. Even Truman's an-
nouncement in March that he would not be a candidate for
re-election failed to sweeten executive-legislative relations. Mr.
Truman left no doubt that he considered "his record" to be the
issue at the coming presidential contest, thus providing a charac-
terization that Republican Congressmen rushed to second, and
Southern Democrats saw as a continued threat to their position
within the party. Economic-group lines duplicated this division.
Big Labor was happily committed to the party of the "Little
Warrior" of 1948, while Big Business was determined to leave no
check unsigned in the effort to place a Republican on Pennsylva-
nia Avenue.
"One product of these varied tensions was widespread labor
unrest. More strikes took place in 1952 than in any year since
1946. Three and one half million workers left their jobs in in-
dustries such as coal, construction, petroleum, telegraph, and
maritime, with cries from each side that the other would have to
bear the stain of Korean casualties on its palms. The most serious
labor dispute of 1952 took place in the nation's most important
and strategic industry-steel. "1
40
"At 10:30 P.M. on April 8, 1952, former President Truman
went to the American people with a message which touched off
the legal battle of the century. 'Tonight', he said, 'our country
faces a grave danger. We are faced by the possibility that at
midnight tonight our steel industry will be shut down. This must
not happen'. Therefore, he said, 'I am directing the Secretary of
Commerce to take possession of the steel mills, and to keep them
operating'." 1 41
"In Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer the Supreme Court
invalidated, as inconsistent with the Taft-Hartley Act, [the]
war-time presidential 'seizure' of strike-threatened steel mills, al-
though Congress did not disapprove the seizure after the Presi-
dent promptly requested congressional review and agreed to abide
140 A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE: YOUNGSTOWN
SHEET AND TUBE Co. V. SAWYER: THE STEEL SEIZURE DECISION 1, 2 (1958).




by congressional policy. Presidential authority to authorize hostil-
ities was not in issue, and the court did not doubt its capacity to
appraise the constitutional basis for the nonmilitary presidential
order, interpret the relevant statutes, and administer a return to
private control.1 1
42
"Common sense requires that any discussion of executive pow-
er should be anchored to the Separation of Powers Doctrine. Why
do we have, as far as is practical, immutable walls between the
three departments of the Go-ernment? The answer lies in exper-
ience. For experience has tatfght us that a concentration of execu-
tive, judicial, and legislative power in the same hands can only
mean the suppression of liberty and the oppression of tyranny.
The experience of the English people with their kings who sought
or exercised unbridled prerogatives, was available to the framers
of the Constitution when they met at Philadelphia. And they sold
the Constitution to the American people on the ground that that
instrument was not calculated to thrust us upon the sword of
despotism. 'Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really char-
geable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of
powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no
further arguments', said Madison, 'would be necessary to inspire a
universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however,
that it will be apparent to every one, that the change cannot be
supported .... " 143
142 Ratner, The Coordinated War-making Power-Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461,487 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
143 Banks, supra note 141, at 497 (footnote omitted). Cf. D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE
CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 414-415 (1969) (footnote omitted):
My recommendation was that the President make a full report on the
Korean situation to a joint session of Congress. This would, of course, be
largely formal but would bring the whole story together in one official narra-
tive and meet the objection of some members that information had come to
them only through the leaders and the press. I also recommended that the
President should not ask for a resolution of appfoval, but rest on his con-
stitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. However,
we had drafted a resolution commending the action taken by the United
States that would be acceptable if proposed by members of Congress. ...
There has never, I believe, been any serious doubt-in the sense of
nonpolitically inspired doubt-of the President's constitutional authority to
do what he did. The basis for this conclusion in legal theory and historical
precedent was fully set out in the State Department's memorandum of July 3,
1950, extensively published. But the wisdom of the decision not to ask for
congressional approval has been doubted. To have obtained congressional
approval, it has been argued, would have obviated later criticism of "Tru-
man's war." In my opinion, it would have changed pejorative phrases, but
little else. Congressional approval did not soften or divert the antiwar critics
of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt. What inspired the later criti-
cism of the Korean war was the long, hard struggle, casualities, cost, frustra-
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As in Medical Committee,1 4 4 in other words, the Court could
be said, in Perlman v. Feldmann, to be exercising governmental
powers normally wielded by legislators and/or administrative
agencies. An argument could be made, of course, that the seizure
of "profits""'1 - of a "premium"- is sufficiently different from the
seizure of steel mills - of real property - to obviate any possibility
of conflict between the Perlman and Youngstown cases; the hold-
ing of Perlman v. Feldmann, then, would be simply that it violates
the law for a corporate fiduciary to profit from economic pres-
sures resulting from the type of national war-time emergency
presented by Korea.
The difficulty with this holding, however, is that it seems so
squarely in conflict with Medical Committee, where "... . manage-
ment in essence decided to pursue a course of activity which
generated little profit for the shareholders and actively impaired
the company's public relations and recruitment activities because
management considered this action morally and politically desir-
able. '" 146 Thus, even if both Perlman v. Feldmann and Medical
Committee can be justified as examples of the general rule that
national war-time emergencies constitute special circumstances
tion of a limited and apparently inconclusive war, and-most of all-the
determination of the opposition to end seemingly interminable Democratic
rule.
Nevertheless, it is said, congressional approval would have done no harm.
True, approval would have done none, but the process of gaining it might
well have done a great deal. July-and especially the first part of it-was a
time of anguishing anxiety. As American troops were committed to battle,
they and their Korean allies under brutal punishment staggered back down
the peninsula until they maintained only a precarious hold on the coastal
perimeter around Pusan. An incredulous country and world held its breath
and read the mounting casualties suffered by these gallant troops, most of
them without combat experience. In the confusion of the retreat even their
divisional commander, Major General William F. Dean, was captured. Con-
gressional hearings on a resolution of approval at such a time, opening the
possibility of endless criticism, would hardly be calculated to support the
shaken morale of troops or the unity that, for the moment, prevailed at home.
The harm it could do seemed to me far to outweigh the little good that might
ultimately accrue.
The President agreed, moved also, I think, by another passionately held
conviction. His great office was to him a sacred and temporary trust, which
he was determined to pass unimpaired by. the slightest loss of power or
prestige. This attitude would incline him strongly against any attempt to
divert criticism from himself by action that might establish a precedent in
derogation of presidential power to send our forces into battle. The memo-
randum that we prepared listed eighty-seven instances in the past century in
which his predecessors had done this. And thus yet another decision was
made.
144 See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
145 Cf. note 82 supra.
146 SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 439 F.2d at 68 1.
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shifting the balances usually maintained between judicial and leg-
islative or administrative power, the fact remains that one Court
of Appeals held against Feldmann on the grounds that he had
profited from the Korean national wartime emergency while an-
other Court of Appeals held against "[t]he management of Dow
Chemical Company" for "proclaiming that the decision to contin-
ue manufacturing and marketing napalm was made not because of
business considerations, but in spite of them." 147
Only if the Korean and Vietnam conflicts are sufficiently
different to justify such seemingly contradictory results does it
appear justifiable to accept as valid today the Perlman v. Feldman
holding delineated above.148 The last two sections of this part C
will attempt to adumbrate precisely such a distinction.
(v)
"Unlike the European colonies liberated from Japan in South-
147 Id.
148 Cf. Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 23 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 3, 19, 31 (1971):
Despite the fact that the per curiam opinion in New York Times in no way
refers to Youngstown or the doctrine of separation of powers, I do not see
how the case can be understood without reference to these matters. Although
perhaps only Mr. Justice Marshall actually accepted Professor Bickel's argu-
ment (and only Mr. Justice Harlan used a similar argument in dissent), it
appears to me that the only principle accepted by a majority of the Court was
that the Executive lacked the inherent power to impose, without legislative
authority, prior restraints upon the press so as to prevent the publication of
news which allegedly would have adverse effects upon our war in Southeast
Asia. And this principle seems to follow a fortiori from the holding of
Youngstown that the executive branch iacked the inherent power to seize the
nation's steel mills in order to prevent a strike which allegedly would have
adverse effects upon the conduct of our war in Korea. A fortiori, because in
Youngstown it seems clear that Congress could have sanctioned the seizure,
whereas in New York Times there is the "heavy presumption" against
constitutional validity or even a congressionally authorized prior restraint on
expression. A brief review of the opinions in New York Times will, I believe,
establish that only the Youngstown rationale secured the adherence of a
majority of the Court....
Youngstown arose during the Korea "war"; New York Times during the
Vietnam "war." Neither of these wars was declared by Congress and in both
cases the Executive argued that the war made its actions necessary. In
Youngstown the steel plants were seized to prevent a strike that supposedly
would have had catastrophic effects on the war effort; in New York Times
the executive branch justified the censorship upon the ground that publica-
tion of the paper would have adverse effects on the conduct of the war, as
well as on our relations with other countries.
There is, however, one major procedural distinction between Youngstown
and New York Times. In Youngstown the Executive acted on its own
initiative in seizing the steel mills and it was the steel companies who sought
an injunction against the Executive's action. In New York Times it was the
Executive who sought an injunction against the papers' action. So, despite all
the parallels that I have noted, the cases are not on all fours. New York
Times is Youngstown turned upside down....
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east Asia, Korea suffered no reoccupation by former rulers. In-
stead, she was taken over and bisected by two victorious powers,
one of which (the U.S.S.R.) had prepared for this, the other of
which (the U.S.A.) had not....
"In the north the Russian aim, to create a Communist satellite
state, was comparatively definite and was achieved in successive
stages. As the Soviet forces came in, the Japanese generally fled
to the south, and Communist-trained Koreans were guided in
building up a Soviet-type state north of the closed border on the
38th parallel. First, Communist elements got control of the
'people's committees' that were being organized at each level of
government-county, municipal, and provincial -while opponents
were got rid of in one way or another (something like a million
North Koreans migrated to the South). Secondly, a number of
manipulated 'democratic' parties were set up to mobilize workers,
farmers, youth, women (now 'emancipated'), adherents of the
Ch'ongdogyo sect, and others in a national front. Finally, Soviet
intransigence having doomed any reunification, elections were
held in November 1946, with almost everyone voting, followed by
a Convention of People's Committee at the capital, P'yongyang,
in February 1947, which in turn set up a People's Assembly. This
Assembly at once elected a People's Committee to run a provi-
sional Korean government. At its head was the original Soviet
nominee, Kim Il-sung, a young man now bearing the name of a
former guerilla leader. The whole process of political in-
doctrination and mobilization was managed by the dominant La-
bor (i.e., Communist) Party, supported by Korean 'people's mi-
litia' numbering 150,000 or more and guided by Soviet advisers in
the background. Along with this political structure went vigorous
programs for rural reorganization in the guise of land reform,
beginning with confiscation and redistribution of landlords' es-
tates, together with nationalization of industry and a planned
economy in general.
"Organized forcibly from the top down, the North Korean
Communist dictatorship, though little studied, seems to have dis-
played most of the strong and weak points typical of such re-
gimes. Being Korean in form, though actually under Soviet con-
trol, it was less offensive than Japanese rule; and its reforms had
their attractions for various groups, particularly in the early stages
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of the totalitarian metamorphosis. In any case, Russian domina-
tion left no alternative. "
149
(vi)
"The 'Mandate of Heaven' is the right to rule which is con-
ferred upon a man, a group of men, or a party, by heaven. It has
been the source of political legitimacy claimed by all Chinese and
Vietnamese emperors. According to the Vietnamese Communists,
the 'Mandate of Heaven' was passed on to them by Bao Dai, the
last emperor of Vietnam, in 1945 when he willingly gave his
ceremonial seal and sword to the representatives of Ho Chi Minh.
From the moment of this transfer, the struggle waged by the Viet
Minh and its successors, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
and the National Liberation Front, was a moral right and a duty,
and to challenge it was immoral. Possession of the 'Mandate of
Heaven' guarantees eventual victory, just as the communist in-
terpretation of history guarantees the inevitable victory of com-
munist ideology. Since the Vietnamese Communists believe they
have the 'Mandate of Heaven', they must believe they will win.
To accept defeat would be to accept that the 'Mandate of Heaven'
does not work; it would compromise the philosophy upon which
Hanoi's leaders have based their entire lives."15 0
"The moment Japan surrendered, [Ho Chi Minh] ordered his
fighters into Hanoi. Like de Gaulle himself in liberated Paris, Ho
received the acclaim due a wartime hero. Some Americans were
with him; among them, General Gallagher and Major Patti of the
OSS, who were so moved by the spirit of the occasion that they
raised the Stars and Stripes near the Communists' revolutionary
banner. Like Sun Yatsen years before, Ho had looked to the
United States for help. On September 2, anticipating allied sup-
port, ignorant of the Potsdam decision and encouraged by the
OSS, Ho issued his own Declaration of Independence. It read in
part: 'All men are created equal. They are endowed by their
149 J. FAIRBANK, E. REISCHAUER & A. CRAIG, EAST ASIA: THE MODERN TRANSFORMA-
TION 844-45 (1965).
150 B. JENKINS, WHY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE KEEP FIGHTING 2 (1970) (footnote
omitted).
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creator with certain inalienable rights, among these are Life, Lib-
erty and the pursuit of Happiness.' 151
"Neither in their propaganda nor in the UN did Ho get much
Soviet help. Moscow expected that the French Communist Party
would establish itself in a French government, and the French
Communist Party line was that Vietnam should achieve its in-
dependence within the framework of the French Union. One Viet
Minh leader told Harold Isaacs that the expected no help from the
Soviet Union. 'The Russians are nationalists for Russia first and
above all. They would be interested in us only if we served some
purpose of theirs. Right now, unfortunately, we do not seem to
serve any such purpose.'
152




2C. COOPER, THE LOST CRUSADE: AMERICA IN VIETNAM 51 (1970) (footnote
omitted).
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